Summer 2009
August 24, 2009 (submitted September 5, 2009)
Dear Istanbul-Tel Aviv-New York Blog readers:
After a long summer break and an even longer time since I submitted a new piece, I have returned to my laptop. Now that the summer has almost come to an end, I sit here in Pangalti, Istanbul, and ponder over what made this summer different than the others. In 11 days, I will return to Brooklyn and to my classes and once again be thrown in current events, which seem more to be a repeat of the past rather than signs to the future.
Growing up Jewish in America, I never really could connect to the Jewish New Year being in September. Clearly, January 1 was the real New Year, and Rosh HaShanah was a day on which know one really knew right off on what day is was going to fall. One year it fell on September 13 (my birthday) another September 5, and then there was those years that it took place at the end of the month. And, it was only years later that as a secular Jew I began to realize what a perfect time it was for the New Year.
Perhaps, even more, the fact that I am an educator and have most of the summers off, September is the time when I return to the classroom. For years, I did not really enjoy summers or long vacations. I also did not enjoy the sea, and at one time I hated the humid heat of Israel. As the years go by, I can claim I am now guilty of all of the above. This summer I spent with friends and family, lovers and companions. Hours and days were spent doing nothing but enjoying the sea, the heat, and beautiful views of the Turkish countryside. While I was only in Israel for a week, I also was happy to sweat to no end and change my soaked clothes three times a day.
Not like past years, this summer I moved beyond Istanbul to discover areas I had yet ventured into. Three trips are worth noting: my trip to the Northeastern Black Sea region (from Kars to Trabazon), the city of Denizli, and the Mediterranean coast close to the city of Kaş. The first trip began in the city of Kars and ended in Trabzon.
In the next few weeks, in addition to reviving the current events sections, I will focus on the new places and share with you my general impressions and thoughts. I will also post photo links for you to see the breathtaking sights. I hope you enjoy.
Yours,
Louis
Sunday, September 6, 2009
Thursday, April 9, 2009
One out of Four (Netanyahu’s Government): A Political Travesty
Last week, after over six weeks of wheeling and dealing, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu finally presented his government to the Israeli parliament and its people. Yes, the 32nd Knesset has received its new list of ministers and including the Prime Minister there are 30 of them; essentially meaning one out of every four Knesset members are now a minister. The phenomenon of the Israeli “inflated” government has reached a dangerous precedence and blame cannot be placed solely on Netanyahu; as they say, “it takes two to tango,” and the line between positions being handed out as bribes (to join the government) and those that were forced upon Netanyahu as blackmail (with him desperately needing the Labor party) has become blurred.
While Netanyahu’s Likud party received 14 ministers, Lieberman’s Israel Home Party and the Labor Party faired well, each receiving 5 ministers. Lieberman was awarded the prestigious Foreign Department (no comment for now) and Labor party head Ehud Barak the Defense Ministry (no comment for now). Close behind the Sephardic Religious party, Shas, received 4 ministers, and their prize was the Ministry of Interior. Lastly, the small Jewish Home party received one minister, the “Ministry of Science.”
While it would be possible to write a long detailed report of the inherent problems of such an inflated government, I will only comment on some of my initial thoughts. Firstly, the apparent absurdity is how previous ministries were divided creating a multiplication of unnecessary departments. For example, the once Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport now has been divided into two departments, separating the education from the culture and sport.
One department being split into two is actually the good case. It seems that Israel will soon become a world capital of rapid development being that there are numerous departments dealing with industry, infrastructure, and social issues. There is the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor, the Ministry of Transportation and Road Safety, the Ministry of the Development of the Negev and Galilee, the Ministry of Regional Development, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Welfare and Social Services, the Ministry of National Infrastructure, and the Ministry of Housing and Construction.
Luckily, Israel has a fine medical infrastructure with the best hospitals and world-renowned doctors and therefore it seems that Netanyahu found it fine not to appoint a Minister of Health, choosing himself to be the minister. After much criticism, this ministry was appointed a Deputy Minister (let us not forget that there are 9 Deputy Ministers in this government). Multi-tasking is a strong point of Netanyahu. In addition to be the Prime Minister and the Minister of Health, he also is in charge of Ministry of Pensioner Affairs and is the official Minister of Economic Strategy (which is separate from the Ministry of Finance). Is it only me who is confused?
While Israel received much attention with Tzipi Livni, a woman, almost taking the reins of the country, this in no way means that their politicians are “enlightened” members priding themselves in gender equality. There are only 2 women ministers out of the 30. It seems that the criteria to become a minister (for a large part at least) is to be a man who is looking for a beefed-up salary, and having no experience whatsoever in the ministry he is presiding over. Overall, there are 21 women out of the 120 Knesset members.
Lastly, Labor Party member Avishai Braverman, who was one of the most outspoken members against joining the current government abandoned his cohorts and moved to the camp of Ehud Barak. As a result, he too was awarded a newly formed ministry: the Ministry of Minority Affairs. Certainly, one of the persons suited best for fixing the economy will supervise the affairs of the Arab minority (Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, and approximately twenty percent of the total overall population). Being himself an academic, Braverman should realize the obvious implications of appointing someone from among the majority to take care of the minority. In any case, we see that women are not the only discriminated groups in Israel. Needless to say, there are no Arab ministers (there is one deputy minister); however, this is the norm in a country where 20 percent of the population are systematically excluded from the political system, even if they do vote and are represented in the Knesset.
Yes, sadly I write these words. It seems that such an inflated government, with many of the ministers being completely unprepared to serve their departments, will lead to higher levels of corruption and injustices which have over the years become the norm in Israeli society. Further, with such a multitude of ministries, how should we expect that any real progress be made on the economy, the peace process, and other pressing issues? If this is not a political travesty then what is.
Louis Fishman
Tel-Aviv
April 9, 2009
While Netanyahu’s Likud party received 14 ministers, Lieberman’s Israel Home Party and the Labor Party faired well, each receiving 5 ministers. Lieberman was awarded the prestigious Foreign Department (no comment for now) and Labor party head Ehud Barak the Defense Ministry (no comment for now). Close behind the Sephardic Religious party, Shas, received 4 ministers, and their prize was the Ministry of Interior. Lastly, the small Jewish Home party received one minister, the “Ministry of Science.”
While it would be possible to write a long detailed report of the inherent problems of such an inflated government, I will only comment on some of my initial thoughts. Firstly, the apparent absurdity is how previous ministries were divided creating a multiplication of unnecessary departments. For example, the once Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport now has been divided into two departments, separating the education from the culture and sport.
One department being split into two is actually the good case. It seems that Israel will soon become a world capital of rapid development being that there are numerous departments dealing with industry, infrastructure, and social issues. There is the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor, the Ministry of Transportation and Road Safety, the Ministry of the Development of the Negev and Galilee, the Ministry of Regional Development, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Welfare and Social Services, the Ministry of National Infrastructure, and the Ministry of Housing and Construction.
Luckily, Israel has a fine medical infrastructure with the best hospitals and world-renowned doctors and therefore it seems that Netanyahu found it fine not to appoint a Minister of Health, choosing himself to be the minister. After much criticism, this ministry was appointed a Deputy Minister (let us not forget that there are 9 Deputy Ministers in this government). Multi-tasking is a strong point of Netanyahu. In addition to be the Prime Minister and the Minister of Health, he also is in charge of Ministry of Pensioner Affairs and is the official Minister of Economic Strategy (which is separate from the Ministry of Finance). Is it only me who is confused?
While Israel received much attention with Tzipi Livni, a woman, almost taking the reins of the country, this in no way means that their politicians are “enlightened” members priding themselves in gender equality. There are only 2 women ministers out of the 30. It seems that the criteria to become a minister (for a large part at least) is to be a man who is looking for a beefed-up salary, and having no experience whatsoever in the ministry he is presiding over. Overall, there are 21 women out of the 120 Knesset members.
Lastly, Labor Party member Avishai Braverman, who was one of the most outspoken members against joining the current government abandoned his cohorts and moved to the camp of Ehud Barak. As a result, he too was awarded a newly formed ministry: the Ministry of Minority Affairs. Certainly, one of the persons suited best for fixing the economy will supervise the affairs of the Arab minority (Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, and approximately twenty percent of the total overall population). Being himself an academic, Braverman should realize the obvious implications of appointing someone from among the majority to take care of the minority. In any case, we see that women are not the only discriminated groups in Israel. Needless to say, there are no Arab ministers (there is one deputy minister); however, this is the norm in a country where 20 percent of the population are systematically excluded from the political system, even if they do vote and are represented in the Knesset.
Yes, sadly I write these words. It seems that such an inflated government, with many of the ministers being completely unprepared to serve their departments, will lead to higher levels of corruption and injustices which have over the years become the norm in Israeli society. Further, with such a multitude of ministries, how should we expect that any real progress be made on the economy, the peace process, and other pressing issues? If this is not a political travesty then what is.
Louis Fishman
Tel-Aviv
April 9, 2009
Sunday, March 29, 2009
A Non-Victorious Victory: the AK Party’s Reality Check
Yesterday, local elections were held in Turkey and there certainly were a few surprises, showing Prime Minister Erdogan that his popularity has its limits. Certainly, the religiously conservative ruling AK party (AKP) has seen its greatest challenge since coming to power in the national elections of 2002. In comparison to the local election of 2004, when they received 42% of the vote, and to the national elections of 2007, when they boosted their support to 47%, their current victory of 39 % shows that their support for the first time has substantially decreased.
Even with the AKP’s huge victory, both the ideologically secular Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP-People’s Republican Party) and the ethnically Kurdish Demokrat Tomplusal Partisi (DTP-Social Democratic Party) demonstrated a great amount of momentum and threatened Erdogan’s hegemony, even if limited. Furthermore, the far-right wing Milli Hareket Partisi (MHP-National Action Party) has once again proven their ability to be a major-minor player, and their capability at capturing the AKP conservative base.
Now, someone not familiar to Turkish politics must be thinking why these elections are to some extent a watershed. First of all, over the last few months leading-up to the elections, Erdogan on numerous occasions made it clear this was some type of referendum on him and his party’s performance; moreover, many analysts suggested that any number under 40% would be sending a strong message to the ruling party. In addition, just days before the election, some polls placed Erdogan’s victory at over 50%. Therefore, when Erdogan held a press conference, even before all the polls had been counted, he reflected on the need to see where the party went wrong. This was not the same Erdogan who we are use to seeing. Tired from intensive campaigning, he was soft spoken with signs of defeat in his voice.
The CHP gains were impressive. They took the city of Antalya gaining almost 15% more votes than the previous local elections, and this despite the AKP’s major investments in the region. Izmir, CHP’s only major metropolis strong hold got even stronger climbing more than 6% and receiving more than 53% of the vote. Even if CHP did not take Istanbul or Ankara, they made serious headway, gaining almost 8% in Istanbul*, and capturing more of the local municipalities. While the AKP retained their base in Istanbul, in Ankara, they dropped a staggering 16%, with the CHP climbing almost 19%. This cannot be overlooked; the days of the secular republic’s capital returning to the hands of a secular party do not seem so far off if these elections are a sign of future sentiments.
One true winner in these elections was the DTP. A party made up mostly of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens in the Southeastern region of the Republic, and one that supports the expansion of Kurdish rights, made sweeping gains despite the AKP’s and Erdogan’s desperate attempts not only to retain their hold but also to do the unthinkable: to take the DTP’s stronghold of Diyarbakir. This attempt failed radically. They lost Van and Siirt; with other regional cities overwhelmingly voting for the DTP. Needless to say, the Diyarbakir “prize” went to the DTP, with over 65% of the vote, showing that Erdogan’s polemic of him wanting to “take” this city was a complete illusion. In Tunceli, where the AKP embarked on “appliance-politics,” passing out washing machines and other appliances in return for votes, the DTP remained in power. Lastly, the city of Igdir, home to a majority Turkish conservative right-wing constituency, will now be ruled by the opposing party, the DTP, with the two conservative AKP and MHP splitting the vote.
Lastly, the MHP, made especially nice gains, taking numerous municipalities such as Adana, which they won after gaining over 20% in popularity since the last municipal elections, and with the AKP losing 10% of their base support. Other gains were made in Balikesir, where they stomped out both the AKP and the CHP, gaining more than 31% since the previous elections. Further, they were able to retain previous strongholds such as the Anatolian city of Kastamonu.
Now, what are the lessons to be learned from all of this data? Clearly, Erdogan has seriously lost out by claiming that these elections were a referendum of sorts. He himself will need to ask why in the cities where the AKP invested in infrastructure and development, the people switched their votes. What are the implications of a strong DTP have concerning the ongoing Kurdish issue? How will the strengthening of the CHP and MHP, both nationalist in outlook, affect Turkey’s foreign policy. In the next few days, I will address some of these issues. For now, it is clear that democracy has punished a prime minister who until yesterday thought he was invincible.
Louis Fishman
March 30, 2009
* This gain is even without the Sisli local municipality, a stronghold of CHP whose mayor, M. Sarigul, broke away as the result of an internal spat with CHP leader Deniz Baykal.
Even with the AKP’s huge victory, both the ideologically secular Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP-People’s Republican Party) and the ethnically Kurdish Demokrat Tomplusal Partisi (DTP-Social Democratic Party) demonstrated a great amount of momentum and threatened Erdogan’s hegemony, even if limited. Furthermore, the far-right wing Milli Hareket Partisi (MHP-National Action Party) has once again proven their ability to be a major-minor player, and their capability at capturing the AKP conservative base.
Now, someone not familiar to Turkish politics must be thinking why these elections are to some extent a watershed. First of all, over the last few months leading-up to the elections, Erdogan on numerous occasions made it clear this was some type of referendum on him and his party’s performance; moreover, many analysts suggested that any number under 40% would be sending a strong message to the ruling party. In addition, just days before the election, some polls placed Erdogan’s victory at over 50%. Therefore, when Erdogan held a press conference, even before all the polls had been counted, he reflected on the need to see where the party went wrong. This was not the same Erdogan who we are use to seeing. Tired from intensive campaigning, he was soft spoken with signs of defeat in his voice.
The CHP gains were impressive. They took the city of Antalya gaining almost 15% more votes than the previous local elections, and this despite the AKP’s major investments in the region. Izmir, CHP’s only major metropolis strong hold got even stronger climbing more than 6% and receiving more than 53% of the vote. Even if CHP did not take Istanbul or Ankara, they made serious headway, gaining almost 8% in Istanbul*, and capturing more of the local municipalities. While the AKP retained their base in Istanbul, in Ankara, they dropped a staggering 16%, with the CHP climbing almost 19%. This cannot be overlooked; the days of the secular republic’s capital returning to the hands of a secular party do not seem so far off if these elections are a sign of future sentiments.
One true winner in these elections was the DTP. A party made up mostly of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens in the Southeastern region of the Republic, and one that supports the expansion of Kurdish rights, made sweeping gains despite the AKP’s and Erdogan’s desperate attempts not only to retain their hold but also to do the unthinkable: to take the DTP’s stronghold of Diyarbakir. This attempt failed radically. They lost Van and Siirt; with other regional cities overwhelmingly voting for the DTP. Needless to say, the Diyarbakir “prize” went to the DTP, with over 65% of the vote, showing that Erdogan’s polemic of him wanting to “take” this city was a complete illusion. In Tunceli, where the AKP embarked on “appliance-politics,” passing out washing machines and other appliances in return for votes, the DTP remained in power. Lastly, the city of Igdir, home to a majority Turkish conservative right-wing constituency, will now be ruled by the opposing party, the DTP, with the two conservative AKP and MHP splitting the vote.
Lastly, the MHP, made especially nice gains, taking numerous municipalities such as Adana, which they won after gaining over 20% in popularity since the last municipal elections, and with the AKP losing 10% of their base support. Other gains were made in Balikesir, where they stomped out both the AKP and the CHP, gaining more than 31% since the previous elections. Further, they were able to retain previous strongholds such as the Anatolian city of Kastamonu.
Now, what are the lessons to be learned from all of this data? Clearly, Erdogan has seriously lost out by claiming that these elections were a referendum of sorts. He himself will need to ask why in the cities where the AKP invested in infrastructure and development, the people switched their votes. What are the implications of a strong DTP have concerning the ongoing Kurdish issue? How will the strengthening of the CHP and MHP, both nationalist in outlook, affect Turkey’s foreign policy. In the next few days, I will address some of these issues. For now, it is clear that democracy has punished a prime minister who until yesterday thought he was invincible.
Louis Fishman
March 30, 2009
* This gain is even without the Sisli local municipality, a stronghold of CHP whose mayor, M. Sarigul, broke away as the result of an internal spat with CHP leader Deniz Baykal.
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