A Collection of Posts on the Turkish Local Elections

Here is a collection of articles I wrote for the upcoming Turkish local elections. Starting with the first post that was posted in early December, before the December 17 corruption probe.  

Did someone say elections in Turkey? (Turkey Local Election coverage 2014, 1)*

Erdoğan’s Greatest Challenge Yet: the Unfolding Corruption Probe (Turkey Local Election coverage 2014, 2)

The Major Contenders: The AKP and CHP (Turkey Local Election coverage 2014, 3)

The Other Contenders: A Look at the MHP (Turkey Local Election coverage 2014, 4)

Tweet Tweet: Erdogan's Failed Attempt at banning Twitter (Turkish Local Election Coverage 2014, 5)

A Short take on the BDP/HDP: From Turkey's Southeastern Kurdish Regions to Istanbul (Turkish Local Election Coverage 2014, 6)

Articles Related to AKP Corruption Probe:

The Twenty-Four Hours that changed Turkey…

Some thoughts on Turkey’s “Parallel State” and Corruption

Erdogan in the headlights: Crimes, corruption and conspiracies* (from Haaretz, December 29, 2013)

A Short take on the BDP/HDP: From Turkey's Southeastern Kurdish Regions to Istanbul (Turkish Local Election Coverage 2014, 6)

Just months before the election campaign began, the Kurdish Peace and Democratic Party (BDP), who has 26 seats in the Turkish parliament, split, with three of its members, Sirri Sureyya Onder, Sebahat Tuncel, and Ertugrul Kurkcu, establishing the Peoples Democratic Party (HDP), which is as an umbrella group for leftist parties and minority-group activist; in essence, serving as the BDP’s western counterpart. 

In the 2009 local elections, the then DTP swept in eight municipalities in Turkey’s Kurdish Southeastern Regions; following the closure of this party, the BDP was established, and in the 2011 national elections, running as independents (not able to pass the ten-percent parliamentary threshold), increased their influence even more in the region. Since then, they have officially been the main intermediaries/representatives in the peace talks between the Turkish government and the jailed PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, with calls among many of their party members for autonomy, following the elections.

The former DTP, now BDP, took 8 municpalities in 2009, with
expected gains in the upcoming local elections (seen in purple).  

The role in the peace process has strengthened the BDP, making Erdogan’s strategy of mustering up support in the Southeast counter-productive; in fact, the BDP could even take two out of the three municipalities the AKP currently holds: Bitlis and Mardin; however, it seems unlikely they can take Sanliurfa. There is no doubt however that the BDP also understands that their future is tied to the AKP, due to the ongoing peace process that could fall victim to any substantial decline in AKP support.

As for the HDP, while its leftist/liberal agenda has an appeal to many fringe groups, their strategy of running Sirri Sureyya Onder as a mayoral candidate has been criticized by many; first, while Onder was a central figure in the Gezi Park Protests, his candidacy seemed doomed from the start and some argue that it will take votes away from CHP’s mayoral candidate Mustafa Sarigul, securing the win of the AKP’s incumbent, Kadir Topbas. However, Onder rightly claims that he is also is taking votes from the AKP. The truth be told however that the final results will most likely show a low performance by Onder, which will demonstrate a tactical mistake on the party to run him as a candidate in the first place, and revealing other weaknesses in the party.           

Tweet Tweet: Erdogan's Failed Attempt at banning Twitter (Turkish Local Election Coverage 2014, 5)

Turkey is waking up today to a new day. And, what makes this day different than all other days? As of late last night, courts throughout Turkey issued orders for the social media Twitter to be blocked. In other words, twitter is now banned in Turkey! While this certainly has sent out shock waves in Turkey, and the world, it is not a great surprise considering the recent passage of the internet law. 

"Don't tire yourself out for nothing Tayyip, we are still here"; a protest
forum group's "Diren Kadikoy-Yogurtcu Park" shared picture

Last year, following the outbreak of the Gezi Park protests, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared that twitter was a “headache.” However, following the December 17th corruption probe, twitter became much more than this, with wire-tapped recordings shared, connecting him and top government officials to massive corruption. Further, they also exposed Erdogan’s direct intervention in the media, among numerous other public and state institutions. While Erdogan is accusing this as a type of "coup" against him by a "parallel state", few doubt the authenticity of the recordings. 

The truth is the move to ban Twitter seems to come out of weakness and not strength. With the local elections just 10 days away, it seems Erdogan, with some polls showing his party could lose Ankara’s municipality, not to mention Istanbul’s, is trying to keep a tight hold over the spreading of new recordings. Further, he could believe that blocking twitter could prevent the immense amount of networking that will occur during the elections via social media.

The problem is that as people logged onto twitter and received the notice that the website was blocked due to a court-order, the twitter waves took ablaze, with Turkish twitter users quickly finding ways to break the ban; within hours hundreds of thousands of tweets had come from Turkey!

A few hours after the Twitter ban took effect, the AKP mayor of Ankara
tweets a smile face ot the world.

If this was not enough, along side of these “rebels,” pro-government newspapers and supporters started to appear. I even took note that Ankara’s incumbent mayor, Melih Gocek, an AKP/Erdogan loyalist, and a known Twitter “addict,” could not resist breaking the ban; he tweeted to the world a smiley face! In short, while most of Turkey was fast asleep, twitter turned into a circus, with most of tweets mocking Erdogan. 

Even if it is clear that his plan has backfired, all eyes will be on Turkey to see how this plays out. There is no doubt that the banning of the internet is just another slap in the face of Turkey’s democracy, which has suffered major blows since the Gezi Park protests. However, the ban on the internet could give the opposition party the push they need.

Caught on a late-night live interview, the opposition CHP Istanbul candidate for mayor, Mustafa Sarigul, lost his cool, and was steaming mad, saying this was an anti-democratic move. Further, he called on Turkey's youth not to take to the streets since this was a clear provocation. 

The next ten days, until the March 30 local elections, will be tense, with no one knowing what is in store; further, there also could be a few surprises awaiting us on election night. Certainly, only time will tell. 

The Other Contenders: A Look at the MHP (Turkey Local Election coverage 2014, 4)

In my last election update, the Major Contenders, The AKP andthe CHP, I explained how despite the ongoing corruption scandals linking Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to a billion-dollar corruption scandal, that this might not radically change the outcome of the local elections; nevertheless, some voices in the AKP have started to lower expectations. Days ago, Huseyin Celik, deputy leader and party spokesman, stated that even if the party supports remains at 38.8% of the total vote, they will see this as a success (considerably less than what the %49.9 the party received in the 2011 national elections).

Just after I submitted my update last week, new tapes were released, with one revealing that Erdogan had called his son Bilal the morning of the December 17, ordering him to “hide” all the (illegal) money he had in his house. Erdogan has remained adamant that the recording was subjected to “montage,” and that it is a fake (something I think that even a good number of his supporters find hard to believe).  For Erdogan’s opponents, the tape confirms that he is at the top of the corruption pyramid. 

While there is no doubt that the CHP will be able to increase their votes by a few percent due to corruption scandal if national elections were held (see former article), the party that could gain the most from possible disgruntled AKP voters is the far-right MHP (the Nationalist Action Party), currently under the leadership of Devlet Bahceli, since 1997.

Similar to the CHP, the MHP has steadily rebuilt itself since the initial shock of the AKP’s 2002 victory; let us not forget that in 1999, the party raked in 18% of the vote, coming in as the second largest in the parliament. However, even if it was voted out of parliament in 2002, it retained a base of over 8%, not like its two former coalition partners (DSP, ANAP) who were made irrelevant ever since. Since 2005, the MHP has kept a steady stream of support of at least 13% of the vote, making it the third largest party.

As for the local elections, in 2009, it fared relatively well, receiving nine municipalities. However, making gains on the local election front will be difficult and if they are able to retaint he number of municipalities they control now  (or lose only one-or-two) , that in itself will be a sufficient to keep them relevant for a gain in the 2015 national elections.

The MHP 2009 Local elections brought them 9 municipalities (in blue)

The reason the MHP has the chance of increasing its power base in national elections is due to its right-wing, semi-conservative agenda, which is much more appealing to some AKP voters than the leaning left CHP. For example, while AKP supporters are giving their support to Erdogan’s attempts to reach a peace agreement with the jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, it seems safe to say that some of Erdogan’s supporters are skeptical about this process to say the least. 

Furthermore, as Erdogan continues to “reshuffle” the police force (thousands of police have been stripped of their positions in the wake of the December 17 probe), the likely choice of these policemen will be to return to the MHP, a party once identified as having a large police constituency. The ripple effect of lost votes from the police could spread far and wide; we are not just speaking of the policemen who were “reassigned” positions, but their families, extended families, and fellow co-workers, for example.

In fact, it is no secret that the MHP has something to gain from the AKP’s difficult days. Increasingly, Erdogan is attacking Bahceli, and even has gone so far as to try to humiliate him emphasizing that Bahceli has never married and does not have children (a big no-no for Erdogan, who continuously preaches to his followers to have at least three children, if not four!)

The fact that Erdogan sees Bahceli as a threat was also made known recently in leaked tapes between the Prime Minister and an executive at Haberturk television. In one conversation, just as the Gezi Protests took over Turkey, Erdogan requested Bahceli’s critical statements be removed from the TV channel’s ticker feed, and in another, he ordered that station manipulate a poll by taking points from the MHP and adding them to the Kurdish party, in order to show greater support for his attempts to make peace.

My next blog will be on the mostly Kurdish BDP/HDP and what might be in store for them in the local elections.....

FOLLOW ME on TWITTER @istanbultelaviv for more on whats happening in Turkey and Israel/Palestine, and the Middle East at large. Contact: louisfishman@gmail.com

The Major Contenders: The AKP and CHP (Turkey Local Election coverage 2014, 3)

Less than 5 weeks away, on March 30, the Turkey’s local elections will take place. There is no doubt that following the December 17 corruption probe the state of politics in Turkey has become precarious to say the least.

As the AKP government does its utmost to block the daily allegations of corruption emerging, it is passing new laws at record speed; one of these laws, is the recent Internet Law, that has been criticized both domestically and globally, as violating freedoms of internet users in the country. Despite all government efforts, Prime Minister Erdogan’s private conversations are being leaked daily, which appear to link him to corruption scandals and directly pressuring media to remove critical content.

Due to this atmosphere, the local election campaign had seemed almost if it had been postponed. However, this past week, we see that at last election time is here, and in full force! Despite the political earthquake however that has taken place in Turkey, for now it appears that the AKP will still come out on top, retaining its comfortable lead over the opposition CHP party. 

The 2009 Election Results: How much will this map change in the upcoming elections? To visit this interactive map see: to Al-Jazeera Turk's election coverage 

While Erdogan is calling this current round a “referendum” of his performance, we have to remember that he declared the same in the 2009 local elections; during that election his party actually lost popular vote (38%) compared to the 2007 national elections (46.47%). Well, despite the comparatively weak performance in 2009, in the 2011 national elections, the AKP hit its all time high, raking in 49.49% of the total vote. In other words, the local elections, even if serving as a possible indicator, cannot predict what will happen in national ones. Therefore, it should be clear that even if AKP drops, which it very well could, this does not necessarily spell long term problems for the party.

However, having said this, there are some developments in the Turkish political map that could serve as a sign of major change. First, the opposition CHP party has systematically consolidated power: in the national elections, it has grown from 19.38% in 2002 to 25.9% in the 2011 elections; in the last local elections it raked in 23% of the vote. If the party continues the trend of convincing the public that it is interested in becoming an inclusive party based on a liberalism, and not on its previous conservative secular tradition, it certainly could reach 30% in the 2015 national elections (not bad at all in a parliamentary system). In other words, while the AKP can afford to lose votes as incumbent party, it is crucial that the CHP will show marked improvement in the local elections in order to keep its electoral base energized and the momentum going.

The Million Dollar question of the upcoming local elections is if the CHP has a chance at taking the two largest municipalities, Istanbul and Ankara. First, while Ankara is important, if the CHP’s Istanbul candidate, Mustafa Sarigul, were to take the greater municipality it would send shock waves throughout the Turkish political system; Istanbul’s greater municipality has been under Muslim conservative parties since 1994, when the now Prime Minister of Turkey, Erdogan, swept it away from the CHP, as the representative of Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah Party.

There is no doubt that Sarigul has the experience (and charisma) to overtake the incumbent AKP mayor, Kadir Topbas, who lost respect in the eyes of many during the Gezi protests and following, having succumbed to the wishes of Erdogan, who often acts as if he is still the mayor of his home city. The question for Sarigul will be if this is enough to pass Topbas, who despite what I said still has major support among different sectors; in an upcoming blog I will address this more in detail. I will also look at CHP’s candidate Mansur Yavas, who also seems determined to his most to push out AKP incumbent Melih Gokcek, who also, despite what seems to be a decline in his support, still appears to have a strong power base.

In the next blog, I will address the current situation of the nationalist MHP party, and the mostly Kurdish/Leftist BDP and its sister party, the HDP. Of course, there will be more to come on the Istanbul and Ankara race. To be continued…..

my recent articles on elections and corruption probe:

http://louisfishman.blogspot.com/2013/12/did-someone-say-elections-in-turkey.html

http://louisfishman.blogspot.com/2013/12/erdogans-greatest-challenge-yet.html

http://louisfishman.blogspot.com/2014/01/erdogan-in-headlights-crimes-corruption.html 

FOLLOW ME on TWITTER @istanbultelaviv for more on whats happening in Turkey and Israel/Palestine, and the Middle East at large. Contact: louisfishman@gmail.com

Erdogan in the headlights: Crimes, corruption and conspiracies* (from Haaretz, December 29, 2013)

The uncovering of a slew of financial scandals in Turkey shocked the country and exposed what appears to be a government corrupt to its bones. It is also a turning point for Turkey’s prime minister for the last eleven years, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the AKP. While few can deny his remarkable achievements - a strong economy, removing the country's military tutelage, working for a just solution for the Kurdish question, and fixing injustices, such as lifting the headscarf ban, the political chaos we are now witnessing is not due solely to the gravity of the corruption issue, but also to Erdogan's miscalculations and inherent weaknesses.

The corruption probe caps a rough two years; after being elected with almost fifty percent of the vote for a third term in 2011, Erdogan was in an ideal position to legislate reforms close to his heart. But the key reform should have been to adopt a new constitution, sealing his legacy as the leader who eradicated one of the last vestiges of the 1980 coup. But his party has now postponed debate on this until after the 2015 parliamentary elections, and Erdogan did not push back against this.

Within the parliament, Erdogan’s push to legislate presidential reform, entitling Turkey’s president to executive powers, was also another miscalculation. According to the AKP’s guidelines, a prime minister can serve only three terms. To realize his dream of leading Turkey until 2023, its 100th anniversary, Erdogan announced plans to run for president in summer 2014. While this option is still possible, his attempts to transfer executive powers to the presidency failed, due to parliamentarians' fears of a 'Putinization' of the Turkish political system.

Since 2011, Erdogan has also had to face a much more organized opposition, both within parliament and on the street. While many focus on Erdogan’s strong poll numbers, it's wrong to ignore the CHP, the main opposition party, which now enjoys the support of a quarter of the Turkish population. However, the opposition is not limited to parliament: Over the last few years, more citizens have taken it upon themselves to express their dissent towards Erdogan’s policies. At sporting events and universities, Erdogan and his ministers have been openly booed, forcing them to seclude themselves within protected domains. This seclusion revealed to the public one of Erdogan's greatest weaknesses: His inability to absorb any forms of dissent.

Erdogan has wrongly interpreted the support of such a large electorate behind him as carte blanche to curb all dissent; where once it was only 'radical' Kurdish and leftist groups which met with teargas, now the mainstream opposition, and almost any group protesting government policy, is subjected to violent police clampdowns. What Erdogan did not understand was that the harder the government fought to silence dissent, the louder the voices were raised, culminating in the Gezi Park protests.

There is no doubt that the Gezi protests surprised Erdogan; however, in place of adopting a damage control plan, he remained defiant, blaming the protests on international conspiracies, with some of his ministers even using the potent Jewish conspiracy card. Taking this route left the Turkish police battling protesters until today in a vicious circle; as Erdogan has never addressed the core of the problem, he has prolonged it, making it much worse. As a result, Turkey has become even more polarized, and, with former liberal support withering away, Erdogan opened the AKP’s door to a more conservative-based factions.

As Erdogan was faced with greater dissent in the public sphere, he also sought to consolidate power within his own party, and there is no doubt that the Gulenist movement, followers of the Turkish religious preacher Fethullah Gulen, in self-imposed exile in the U.S., was top of his list. Known also by the term Hizmet, the Gulen followers were a major sub-faction of Erdogan's AKP, who joined forces against the Turkish military. Over the years it became apparent that this was a marriage of convenience, and that a power struggle was inevitable.

During the last few weeks, an all-out war of words has erupted within the AKP between the two factions, a particularly messy fight thanks to how integrally woven into the party the Gulenists are. Following the corruption probe, this group has been targeted by Erdogan as those conspiring against his leadership, strengthened by the rumors that they have a strong presence within the judiciary and police force.

While there is a kernel of truth concerning the Gulenists' influence within state institutions, it in no way exonerates those accused of the alleged crimes. Yet, like the Gezi protests, the prime minister has brushed off this corruption as an international conspiracy as well, with some even linking the Gulen movement with Israel in a plot against Turkey. Erdogan has stepped up his campaign against his opponents, tagging them as traitors. The rhetorical volatility is reaching a tipping point that risks bringing Turkey back to the dark days of the past. There are also serious allegations that Erdogan is meddling in judicial affairs, raising concerns about the future of Turkish democracy.

If the corruption allegations are true, it seems impossible that Erdogan will remain unscathed. With the local elections months away, and presidential and parliamentary ones on the horizon, he faces an unprecedented challenge. No electorate likes polarization; nor, does the financial sector, weary after this week’s stock market losses. Perhaps the resignation of members of his own party resign will convince Erdogan to rethink his moves in order not to lose significant popular support.

There is no doubt that Erdogan is a political genius, but he might be running out of the clout he once wielded. Erdogan is facing a rough road ahead, and he is taking a whole country with him on this journey.

Louis Fishman is an assistant professor at Brooklyn College, City University of New York and writes on Turkish, and Israeli/Palestinian affairs. His upcoming book is on Ottoman Palestine.  He has lived most of his life between the U.S., Israel, and Turkey. Follow himon Twitter: @IstanbulTelaviv He blogs at: http://louisfishman.blogspot.com

*This article appeared originally in Haaretz on Dec 29, 2013; I am placing the entire text here since due to the paywall sometimes the link is blocked

http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.565912

The Twenty-Four Hours that changed Turkey…

…on the twenty-fifth of December. While perhaps it is still early to make such a bombastic statement, however there is no doubt that what we saw on this day is an historic turning point. For the first time, Turkish citizens and analysts alike are starting to imagine a Turkey without the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  

Turkey's opposition paper: Earthquake

The arrests on December 17 (see former blog) have thrown Turkey into a state of chaos, culminating in the resignation of three government Ministers on December 25. The first two resigning ministers have sons under arrest, linked to the probe; the powerful Interior Minister, M. Guler, and the Minister of Economic Affairs, Z. Caglayan, who is also accused of receiving a $350,000 watch as bribe. However, it was the resignation of Environment Minister, E. Bayraktar, that set off a massive political earthquake. Bayraktar, angry at the allegations and for being pressured to resign, called upon Erdogan to resign, stating that “because a big part of the zoning plans that are in the investigation file and were confirmed were made with approval from Mr. Prime Minister.”

Pro-goverment paper blames US, Israel, and Gulen group

Just hours after the resignations came the second political earthquake: news came in that a “Second Wave” arrests was about to take place. However, no time at all passed before rumors spread throughout the media and twitter waves that the police were refusing to carry out the prosecutor’s orders, which included the detainment of Erdogan’s son, Bilal, along with a whole list of key business figures.

The next day, late in the afternoon, news broke that the prosecutor of the “Second Wave,” had been removed from the case. According to the prosecutor, M. Akkas, “I learned that I was removed from my duty without any justification, while the search warrants, seizure [of materials] and arrest orders [were also taken from me]. The responsibility from now on falls with the Istanbul public prosecutor and his deputy. All of the public and my colleagues should know that my task as a prosecutor has been obstructed…”

Liberal Taraf paper claims "Second Wave" probe deals with
100 billion dollars

In the meantime, Erdogan, who just appointed a new cabinet in a "reshuffle" (a move planned ahead of probe in preparation of the March local elections and post-budget approval) has opted to stand strong against all accusations of corruption, blaming it on international conspiracy. Further, he even went so far to praise the main suspect of the “First Wave” of the corruption probe, Reza Zarrab, and is standing by the CEO of Halkank, who was allegedly found with shoe boxes of dollars stashed away in his home. In Erdogan’s words,“Zarrab exports gold and I know that he is involved in charity activities as well.” In others, if some thought he would throw Zarrab and his accused accomplices “under the bus,” at least for now that is far from the case.

In my last blog, I asked how long will AKP MPs be willing to put up with this circus; one major MP already resigned on December 25 (following the resignation of the ministers), Idris Naim Sahin; another MP, hinted to widespread corruption while handing over his post to the newly appointed minister after Erdogan relieved him from his position as minister in the “reshuffle.” Lastly, one AKP MP criticized the PM for appointing an Interior Minister who is not a MP. However, the fact that there is a stirring within the party, does not mean that we are anywhere near a group of AKP MPs abandoning Erdogan, in order to set up a new party within the parliament.

Nevertheless, if the state of affairs continue to deteriorate at the speed it has been during the last few days, it seems hard to imagine that his party members will remain silent. In the event they do not take matters into their hands, then Erdogan will need to face a growing chorus of opposition calling for his resignation, or at least, early elections, among the Turkish population at large.   For now, however, the ball is still in Erdogan's court, and he very well could come out on top if he plays his cards right.   

Erdoğan’s Greatest Challenge Yet: the Unfolding Corruption Probe (Turkey Local Election coverage 2014, 2)

A Turkish telenovela could not have had a better script: last Tuesday morning, police forces completed an early morning raid detaining some of the country’s top political, social, and business elite: An Iranian-Azeri businessmen, married to a famous pop-star; three government ministers’ sons; the CEO of a government bank; a multi-millionaire construction tycoon; and a local mayor of Istanbul’s Fatih district, a member of the ruling government. Within hours of the arrest, it was clear that this would be one of the greatest scandals in Turkish history, a graft probe that connected the lives of the rich and famous with the country’s top politicians.  

Reza Zarrab (left) with Turkish Minister Suat Kılıç (right)

Since news broke almost a week ago, we have learned that the raid was related to three different probes, and two of the big names, each belonging to a different probe, have been released awaiting trial: the construction mogul, Ali Agaoglu, and the mayor of Fatih municipality, Mustafa Demir. While these two probes are quite telling on their own accord, the graft probe that has shaken the Turkish political world to the core is related to the arrest of Reza Zarrab, the Iranian-Azeri businessman (married to the famous singer Ebru Gündes), who is accused of paying off millions of dollars to high-ranking personalities, such as, two government ministers’ sons, and the CEO of the state ran bank, Halkbank. Further, it is alleged that Egemen Bağış, the Turkish Minister of EU Affairs, was central in acquiring Turkish citizenship for Zarrab, and rumored that the Economic Minister, Zafer Cağlayan, whose son was arrested, received a $350,000 watch as a present from Zarrab.  

During the last week, Turkey's once believed-invincible Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has been working hard to close the pandora’s box that has been opened: following the arrests, he sacked tens of high-ranking police officers involved in the trial, and is placing great pressures on the judicial system. Similar to his reaction during the Gezi Park protests, the Prime Minister, is trying to convince all that this is the work of secret forces; some pro-government newspaper outlets have placed blame on the US, while others on the likely candidate, Israel (surely it must be the Jews behind this). However, the gravity of this embarrassment is not the fact that his government is condoning rampant corruption, rather, more and more, it seems like it is an integral part of it.

Reza Zarrab in background steps away from Turkish Minister
Egemen Bağış (right)

Just days ago, numerous photos have hit the press showing Reza Zarrab at official state events and ceremonies, leading some to cynically suggest that Zarrab should be declared as an honorary member of the government. While there is no photo of him with the Prime Minister, he appears twice with the PM’s wife, Emine Erdoğan, together with Suat Kılıç, the up-and-coming favorite Minister of Erdoğan, in a photo with the previously mentioned Minister, Egemen Bagis, and with the wife of the Interior Minister, Muammer Güler, whose son was one of the ones arrested. In other words, from the photos it is apparent that Reza Zarrab had very close relations with many in the high-echelons of the governing AK party; further, his presence at official openings begs the question whether or not he or his wife, Gündeş, contributed illegal monies to public institutions.

Zarrab’s close relations is damning to the AK Party’s image that was elected as an anti-corruption party. During their eleven years in power, rumors of corruption have come-and-gone, and with over four-hundred billion dollars of foreign investment energizing Turkey’s economy, and the subsequent over-the-top construction boom, corruption seems almost unavoidable (something that is central to the two previous probes that were mentioned at the beginning of the article). However, most damaging to the party, is the fact that Erdoğan has decided to challenge the allegations head-on, risking a head-on collision with the Turkish electorate, which despite all his rallying, must simply be tired of the endless controversy; yes, some Turkish citizens might have not been the most sympathetic to the Gezi Park protests, but this too took a toll on them. Now, if Erdogan does not quickly take control (with no signs of this in the future), he is at risk of being left alone, with a much less (even if consolidated) numbered of die-hard supporters.

If this was not enough, with the Gülen Movement accused as being the perpetrators, uncovering of this scandal, it is hard to imagine that the party will be able to make up the votes lost due to the parting of this once staunch ally. Furthermore, even if it is too early to predict how this scandal will play out, it perhaps is time to ask how much longer members of Erdoğan’s party will put up with this circus; at what point will respectable members of his cabinet jump ship. Such as, Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who, despite criticism of his foreign policy, remains a serious politician that could lead a conservative agenda in Turkey. Lastly, it seems more likely than ever that Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gül, also will remain unscathed from these scandals, and this could be an opportunity to strengthen his hold over Turkish politics.

In the first article of my series on the upcoming Turkish local elections, I ended by saying that this season will be interesting to say the least, no one could have predicted such a major fallout. What is clear is that if there was any chance for opposition parties to make gains against the AK Party, the time is now. Also, if Erdoğan weathers this storm, he certainly he will hold up his reputation as being the political genius, as we all know him as; but the question remains, at what price. 

Whatever comes out of this political scandal, it is clear that the biggest loser from this graft probe will not be one politician or another, truly, it is the Turkish state's standing among its citizens, and in the world. They say in Turkish, yazık (it's a pity); simply put, this probe cannot be described in any other way. 

Did someone say elections in Turkey? (Turkey Local Election coverage 2014, 1)*

At the end of March 2014, Turkey will once again head to the polls to vote in mayors for the country’s municipalities, marking five years since the previous ones, and almost three years since the 2011 national elections. While local elections do not always serve as an indicator for the general public’s confidence in a ruling party, there is no doubt that the upcoming elections in Turkey is quickly turning into a referendum for the ruling AK Party, which received almost fifty percent of the vote in the last national elections.  

Actually, it is not the opposition parties that are treating this as a referendum, who obviously know the stakes are high; rather, it is Turkey’s strong Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is pushing this stance. We have to remember that Erdogan is at his best during elections, and during the past few weeks he has been campaigning “full-steam ahead.” 

Ever since the Gezi Park protests, in fact, Erdogan has been on a non-stop campaign challenging his opponents, or anyone who has the potential to challenge his hegemony, one-by-one. Most recently, in an attempt to consolidate power within his own party, the Turkish prime minister opened a front against the Gülen movement, or what is known in Turkish as the Hizmet (Service) movement, or the Cemaat (the Society). However, it is still premature to see how the unfolding row will play out in the upcoming local elections. Clearly, the twitter wars between the two camps has showed us just how messy Turkish politics can become.  

What is clear is that Erdogan’s constant divisive “powerhouse” politics will most likely lead to a decline in his support, something I already claimed just two weeks before the Gezi protests. However, let us not lose sight, local elections can be misleading; it is important to remember that Erdoğan also treated the 2009 elections as a referendum and despite the opposition parties gaining some ground, just two years later, in the national elections, he swept the ballots, getting almost 50% of the general vote (see my former blogs on 2009 local election, and 2011 national elections). 

The key to any true success on behalf of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), will depend greatly on how dynamic their candidates are, and the party’s ability to open the door to communities they have shunned in this past. In Istanbul, and the other major cities, utilizing the space the Gezi Park protests created without exploiting it will be central; in other words, the party will need to capture the overall population’s imagination, heightening spirits that change is possible. 

During the next 3.5 months, I will be covering different aspects of the elections and focusing on how other parties, such as the newly formed Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) and how its candidate for Istanbul, the Gezi protester and MP, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, will influence the race. On the same token, I will be watching if CHP’s choice of Mustafa Sarıgul to run for mayor in Istanbul was a good or bad one (he will officially open his campaign this Thursday). Further, I will give a rundown of the other cities and regions, looking at which parties are most likely to make gains, or hold ground, such as the Peace and Democratic Party (BDP) in the southeastern Kurdish regions, and the National Action Party (MHP), in the western regions and some cities in the interior.  Indeed, this election should be an exciting one! 

*The coverage will be indexed as seen above in title

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