Named after the three cities I live in, this blog will focus on Israeli, Palestinian, and Turkish politics and social issues. In addition, I will periodically cover other topics related to the Middle East.
Showing posts with label Gaza. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gaza. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 27, 2016
Wednesday, July 30, 2014
Has Hamas miscalculated Turkey's role?- Some Thoughts on Regional Divisions
It has almost been a month since Israel launched its attack on Gaza, with the world standing by as over a thousand
Palestinian civilians have been killed; it being clear that by all estimates
Hamas militants killed in the fighting easily makeup the minority of victims.
Despite this, Hamas remains defiant from
the start to continue with the “noble resistance” of shooting rockets into
Israel, and attacking Israeli civilian and military targets via the tunnels.
And, despite their large arms cache, and improved tactics, the Islamist group
has proved mostly incapable of penetrating Israel’s iron dome and borders.
After such mass violence -- all claim that
this round of violence far surpasses previous rounds of fighting -- it is clear that no protest, diplomatic sanctions, and international pressure, will
distract the Israeli government from its onslaught. While it seems that both
sides were not interested in the mass escalation, the question is why then have
we reached this point where no ceasefire has been able to take hold.
Anyone surprised at the death and
destruction however should take a moment and place the current state of affairs
in Gaza into the context of the current state of affairs of the Middle East.
Following the Arab Spring, or more correctly, the popular uprising staged
against the region’s dictators, the Middle East has become even more polarized,
exacerbating regional divisions.
Egypt’s former president Mohammed Morsi,
who represented the Muslim Brotherhood, first brought hopes of change,
providing support for Hamas. However, his policies set off mass protests at
home, which led to a coup d’état. The
downfall of Morsi was not only a major blow to Hamas but also to Turkey’s
Erdogan who saw himself as Morsi’s mentor. Without Egypt, Turkey would now represent
Hamas’ stance; albeit, with little success.
Just like Egypt, the Syrian conflict, which
has led to the death over 170,000 people, shook the region and ignited the realigning
of previous alliances. Just years before the breakout of the Syrian revolution,
Erdogan placed his bets on Assad, which signaled a forming alliance against Israel, Mubarak’s
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and not surprisingly against the Palestinian authority.
Once again Turkey landed on the side of Hamas.
As the Syrian revolution turned into a
civil war, Turkey realigned itself with radical groups against Assad’s forces, while Hamas was left without Syrian-and Iranian-support. In fact, even if Turkey never
officially pronounced its support for these groups, there is plenty of evidence that it
supplied arms to ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra fighters and allowed them free movement
within their border (with the grace of the United States).
With this Middle East division, Hamas was
left with two countries, Turkey and Qatar. In other words, the deadlock in
reaching a ceasefire seems to be due to the fact that Hamas placed its hopes on Turkey and Qatar's ability to successfully lobby on its
behalf. However, until now this has clearly failed.
Just as Turkey's strategy failed in Syria, it seems that its strained relations with Israel and Egypt has made it more irrelevant
than ever before. Even if Turkey succeeds in brokering a ceasefire, it will not be much more than a photo-op since in the end it seems it will most likely be dictated by Egypt. Regardless of the outcome, the current crisis has shown once again Turkey's inability to progress regional stability.
No doubt that in the meantime Palestinians are in dire need of a ceasefire to stop the killing-something that Syrians, Iraqis (and Libyans) most likely will not get the chance to encounter in the near future. However, rest assured that even if the polarized Middle East has caused a great deal of death and destruction, there could be much more in sight.
Sunday, November 25, 2012
Who can declare Victory, Hamas? Israel?, Plus a Look at Gaza
Following the Israeli Gaza bombardment, the
second in the last four years, Hamas was quick to declare victory. The two
sides had reached a ceasefire, which most likely was similar to the one that they were about to sign just a week before the Israeli operation began. During the week long
campaign, in the name of self-defense, the Israelis used excessive force (an understatement),
bombing Gaza’s infrastructure, and killing over 160 people. While Israelis
claim this was done to stop the firing of rockets on their civilian population,
which under no circumstances can be condoned, it is safe to say that the
escalation could have been avoided, and was sparked by Israel, following the assassination of Hamas leader, Ahmad al-Jabari.
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I have provided some staggering statistics below, which show the sheer desperation Gazans face on a daily basis:
Israel signed the ceasefire seemingly to
avoid a ground invasion. Prime Minister Netanyahu knew too well that a botched operation
could spoil his plans to be re-elected in January. And, if it was not due to election speculation, the fact is that Israel was not able to stop the rockets from showering Israel, even after wreaking mass havoc. So, in that sense, Israel did not win. But, did they lose? Certainly, not; in this game that has gone on far too long, there are no "winners," and the losers are the masses of people who are caught up in the fire of their politicians, who recklessly "fight in their name."
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On Gaza Affair and Regional issues, plus Hard Questions for Israel, click here
Relation between the Gaza Affair and Israeli Elections, click here
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Therefore, an Israeli non-victory also does not equal a Hamas victory; something Hamas claimed, following the signing of the ceasefire. Yes, they succeeded to hit Tel Aviv with their rockets; the last time this happened was in 1991, when during the first Gulf War Iraq fired scud missiles, much larger than the Hamas rockets. Hamas also succeeded in holding their own; but to claim that this was a victory is absurd. Especially, at what cost! During the midst of fighting, I simply did not buy Hamas’ persistence to shoot rockets into Israel as a noble resistance, and I placed it on the same level as the Israelis’ sick obsession of bombing the hell out of Gaza. The Hamas’ policy of continued resistance (shooting rockets) can only be interpreted as one of "we will go down with the ship no matter what, taking all of our passengers with us." And, for all those claiming victory, they should open their eyes and see that for Hamas, this was a major blow, but for Gaza it was much bigger.
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On Gaza Affair and Regional issues, plus Hard Questions for Israel, click here
Relation between the Gaza Affair and Israeli Elections, click here
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Therefore, an Israeli non-victory also does not equal a Hamas victory; something Hamas claimed, following the signing of the ceasefire. Yes, they succeeded to hit Tel Aviv with their rockets; the last time this happened was in 1991, when during the first Gulf War Iraq fired scud missiles, much larger than the Hamas rockets. Hamas also succeeded in holding their own; but to claim that this was a victory is absurd. Especially, at what cost! During the midst of fighting, I simply did not buy Hamas’ persistence to shoot rockets into Israel as a noble resistance, and I placed it on the same level as the Israelis’ sick obsession of bombing the hell out of Gaza. The Hamas’ policy of continued resistance (shooting rockets) can only be interpreted as one of "we will go down with the ship no matter what, taking all of our passengers with us." And, for all those claiming victory, they should open their eyes and see that for Hamas, this was a major blow, but for Gaza it was much bigger.
Not Hamas, Not Israel, let the Palestinian People be the Victors
I should hope that after all this pain and
suffering that the real victors will be the Palestinian people. In four days, on November 29, 65 years after the UN declared that Palestine would be divided into a Jewish and Arab state, it
is likely that Palestine is going to be recognized by the UN General Assembly
as a non-member state. As it stands now, the Palestinians have a chance to win the needed 2/3 of
the vote, with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas set on moving forward, despite Israel’s threats to
topple him if he succeeds. Now, the time has come for the world to stand up and recognize Palestine. Yes, most
likely, the United States and Europe will object or sustain; yet, if they do so, this will be
a stain on these countries, especially after the Gaza operation. For US President, Barack Obama, this is gus chance to prove to the world that he is serious about reaching a comprehensive peace settlement (see former blog related to this)
For Gaza, they urgently need the status of statehood. Once this is achieved it will be a golden
opportunity for the world to take steps to end the blockade, and second, to
take responsibility to solve the real crisis in Gaza: mass poverty,
unemployment, coupled with one of the highest birthrates on the planet (see below). The
time has come for Gaza, regardless which government rules there, or what
actions are taken, that the world take notice of the suffering that has gone on
there for decades.
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FOLLOW ME on TWITTER @istanbultelaviv for more on whats happening in Turkey and Israel/Palestine, the uprising in Syria, and the Middle East at large.
I have provided some staggering statistics below, which show the sheer desperation Gazans face on a daily basis:
Population: 1,710,257 (Gaza City is one of
the most densely populated places in the whole world!)
43.8% 0-14 years of age (male 384,494/
female 363,818)
54.7% 15-63 (male 469,528/ female 448,182)
65 years and over: 2.6% (male 17,939/ female 26,296) (2012 est.)
Median Age male-17.9 years old (some
statistics places this even at 14)
Infant mortality about 17/1000 births
Unemployment rate: 40% (184th
country out of 201)
Poverty Rate 38%
Literacy rate: 92.4%
- Gazan households spend 56
percent of their expenditures on food, with 52.5 percent eating lower
quality food and 67 percent buying food on credit as a result of high food
costs.
- 54 percent of households
face food insecurity, defined as
inadequate physical, social or economic access to food. An additional 12
percent are considered vulnerable to food insecurity. Only 20 percent of
Gazan households are food secure.
- 38 percent of the
population lives below the poverty
line.
- Since the blockade began, the
number of Palestinian refugees completely unable to secure access to food
and lacking the means to purchase even the most basic items, such as soap,
school stationery and safe drinking water (‘abject poverty’) has tripled to 300,000.
- 75 percent of households polled by the World Food Programme in the Gaza Strip received
outside aid.
- Gaza’s hospitals are at “zero stock levels” for 178 of 480 essential medications, with another 69 at low
stock. Of 700 essential medical supplies, 190 are at “zero stock levels”
and another 70 at low stock.
- Due to lack of fuel, the Gaza Power Plant runs at 45 percent capacity, leading to
daily blackouts of eight to twelve hours. Given this fuel shortage, 90
percent of private cars are no longer driven and of public services, only
15 percent are operational. (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, The
Illegal Closure of the Gaza Strip: Collective Punishment of the Civilian
Population, December 10, 2010)
- The Gaza aquifer provides 90 percent of Gaza’s water. Only ten percent of that
water meets the standards of being suitable for consumption. Water-borne
diseases cause 26 percent of illnesses in Gaza.
- Because of lack of treatment capacity
and electricity, Gaza authorities
must release around 80,000 cubic meters of sewage into the Mediterranean
Sea on a daily basis.
- The construction of 86,000
houses is required to meet natural growth and
recover from previous Israeli invasions.
- Economic output per capita has fallen by 40 percent of
1994 levels.
- 95 percent of Gaza’s 3,900
industrial businesses are closed or have suspended work. The other five percent are
operating at 20 to 50 percent of capacity. This has cost between 100,000
and 120,000 jobs.
- Israeli restrictions block
access to 35 percent of Gaza’s
agricultural land and fishermen are forbidden to fish beyond 3 nautical
miles from the shore. In 2010,employment in agriculture
fell from 14,900 to 10,100.
- While Gaza needs 670,000
truckloads of construction material,
an average of 715 enter per month, at 11% of pre-blockade levels. The
construction industry now has 10,000 workers, 42 percent of pre-blockade
levels.
- Unemployment is at 45.2
percent, with only 40.3 percent of
working-age Gazans in the labor force. Youth unemployment is at more than 47 percent.
- 290 truckloads of exports were allowed out of Gaza between November 2010 and May 2011.
Before the siege, more than 960 truckloads a month exited Gaza. This is
onlyfive percent of
pre-blockade levels.
- In 2011, a weekly average of 900
truckloads of goods entered Gaza.
Before the siege, 2,807 truckloads entered weekly.
- On March 2, 2011, Israel closed the Karni crossing, forcing importers and exporters to use the Kerem Shalom
crossing. For wheat exporters, this increased transport costs by 235
percent and for wheat importers by 30 percent.
- Between June 2010 and
March 2011, the cost of wheat flour
increased by 50 percent and vegetable oil increased by 40 percent.
Meanwhile, the average wage has decreased by more than 25 percent since
2007.
Thursday, November 15, 2012
The Escalation in Gaza: its Twitterization and how Operation Hits at the Heart of Israeli Democracy (Israeli 2013 Election Coverage, 3)
Late yesterday afternoon (in Istanbul),
while doing my evening shop in a supermarket a beep came from i-phone. It was
an update from Yedioth Ahronot, informing me that Israel had set
off on Operation Pillar of Defense against the Hamas-controlled Gaza
Strip. I sighed, grabbed enough food to make dinner, and within minutes had returned
home to see the developments.
Twitterization of the Conflict
Well, my fears were immediately confirmed.
First, turning on the BBC, news was coming in of a massive Israeli onslaught, which
began with the targeted assassination of Hamas military leader, Ahmad
al-Jabari. However, as a relatively new
twitter user, I knew this would provide me with good sources to see how this
struggle was playing out. In English,
Hebrew, Arabic, and Turkish, I scanned the tweets, one by one. One tweet was from Gaza announcing bombs
going off, another Gazan mentioned that rockets had just been fired at Israel; within minutes, an Israeli tweeted that sirens had just gone off in Beer Sheva.
In other words, I was watching the war from my home in Istanbul, succumbed by
the feeling that I was there. Definitely,
a post-modern reality. Not surprisingly, I later learned that the Israeli army first announced the beginning of the operation via their twitter account.
I myself began to tweet in different
languages. In Turkish I tweeted
one thing, in Hebrew another, and English something different (need to add Arabic fonts!), trying to speak to different
communities. It turned out to be a frustrating exercise since I know if I
was in Israel I would have been out in the street demonstrating, shouting out
in a full voice: no to escalation, no to war! Yes, by tweeting I was actually
addressing a group, who I could not see.
In a street demonstration, I can capture the eyes of thousands, it is real-time,
with real reactions of people, some clapping and others cursing. In fact,
almost four years ago, I was in Israel during Operation Cast Lead and we did that:
together Jews and Palestinians, we took to the streets.
The Escalation and the Upcoming Israeli
Elections
Yes, it has been four years since the last
Israeli-Palestinian war in Gaza. Sadly, neither social media, nor people protesting,
have succeeded in finding some way to convince both Israelis and Palestinians to
give up arms and find a solution. This latest escalation is typical. It began last week as skirmish on the Gaza-Israel
border between Hamas and the Israeli army, leading to Israeli reprisal and Hamas
shooting rockets into Israel’s southern cities. Which side was “first” is not important. By targeting Jabari, Israel knew that
this was a declaration of war, and rather than continuing the negotiations for
a cease-fire, they escalated.
What is worrying is the timing of the
escalation. With the Israeli elections
just a little over two months away, many analysts are accusing Israeli PM Netanyahu
as using the onslaught to convince the Israeli people of his ability to manage a
major operation, especially since he has made it clear that he believes
Israel should target Iran, in the event they are close to obtaining nuclear arms. For his Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, who now leads the small Atsmaut
(Independence) Party, after defecting from Labor, a successful operation might actually give his party enough votes to cross the threshold to enter parliament.
Well, we can speculate all we want, and I
am sure that there was not a scenario where Netanyahu and Barak sat down and
said to one another, “time to start a war.”; however, how could this not be in the back
of their minds. In any case, Netanyahu must be quite confident of the operation's success since dragging in
Israel to a major conflict could also lead to him losing elections. With Israel being militarily superior, this scenario seems unlikely.*
I will conclude by saying then, yes, Israel
has a right to defend itself, just like the Palestinians have a right to defend
themselves. However, what might be at stake here is actually the Israeli
democracy itself. The truth be known, the recent escalation
could have been diverted, which leads us to the simple but loaded question:
In a democracy, doesn't the launching of such an operation
before an election counter the essence of a democratic system? I would say
yes, and therefore argue that the timing of this operation is not only an attack on
Gaza, but also on democracy and the future essence of the Israeli state.
*Israeli superiority is also related to changes in regional politics, which I will address in an upcoming blog.
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