Post Turkish Referendum Analysis: Its not Yet Game Over*

Haaretz: "It's too early to declare the Turkish Republic dead and buried. The president's popularity has maxed out at 50 percent of the population, and the anti-Erdogan opposition won't be silenced"

Walking the streets of Istanbul just a week before the country’s fateful referendum, from any and every point I could see the larger-than-life faces of the country’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, or his Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim, trying to convince voters to get out and vote “Yes,” for a ‘better’ Turkey. That entirely disproportionate number of “Yes” campaign posters filled the streets of even overwhelmingly anti-AKP neighborhoods; even there very few posters could be seen pushing a “No” vote.  

Nevertheless, I sensed hope among many “No,” voters, who believed that in the end, it was the Turkish people who would decide the fate of the referendum and not posters. Further, what might have appeared to some as a lack of organization among the “No” camp, was actually a strategy; the secular-CHP, the smaller, mostly Kurdish, HDP, and other fringe parties and civil organizations, maintained a significant measure of autonomy, presenting their case to their own constituencies, in place of opting for a unified campaign. Solidifying each voting bloc rather than attempting a one-size fits all campaign.

But it wasn’t only the Yes vote takeover of the public space that constituted an unfair playing field. The whole  referendum process itself took place under a State of Emergency. While the government had a free hand to do what it wanted, some of the strongest voices in the “No” camp were severely constrained: some are sitting in prison, such as the co-chairs of the HDP party, Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, together with government critics, not least a slew of journalists, such as Ahmet Sik and Kadri Gursel. 

While the Turkish government claimed foul play in Europe, when some European leaders blocked Turkish officials from campaigning on European soil, ‘No’ campaigners ironically faced bans within Turkey itself. The Ankara rally of Meral Aksener, the rising voice among Turkey’s nationalists, was cancelled by the local authorities unwilling to provide her security. Aksener was not just aiming her opposition at Erdogan, but also her former party head, the nationalist MHP leader, Devlet Bahceli, who repelled many party members with his support for Erdogan, seen as a desperate tactical attempt to hold on to power.  

Another ‘No’ campaigner, Tuna Beklevic, was prevented from holding rallies on the grounds that his party hadn’t been officially recognized, despite fulfilling all the requirements. Beklevic persevered, visiting numerous cities and using Facebook to hold a virtual rally which attracted almost 70,000 viewers.

Well, the government ended up with a huge surprise last Sunday when - despite some polls predicting an easy victory for them - the opposite occurred. The “No” camp gave Erdogan, and his weak nationalist ally, Devlet Bahceli, a run for their money, with Turkey’s three major cities, Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir (and many other urban centers) going to the “No” camp. Even if the “Yes,” camp won on bare numbers, the outcome of 51.41 percent to 48.59 percent was achieved only among serious concerns of mass voter fraud.

Since the referendum results were released, protesters have taken to the streets across Turkey demanding the Supreme Election Council explain its last minute acceptance of over a million “non-stamped ballots,” and address a long list of documented irregularities. However, the Council has flatly rejected their call, strengthening fears that it too has all but become a government mouthpiece. Unfortunately, the “No” camp has little power to enforce its demands and its attempts to bring it to the Constitutional Court will have a slim chance at best to produce results. However, its persistence stains the legitimacy Erdogan so longs for.  

So where from here? Some analysts have gone so far as to declare the end of the Turkish Republic, reiterating much of their pre-referendum coverage, which characterized the vote as a zero-sum game of dictatorship versus democracy.  

This dichotomy ignores the fact that even if the “No” camp had won the referendum, under the current State of Emergency, Erdogan and his AKP party which has a strong grip over Turkey’s bureaucracy and government offices, would continue to rule solely (and oppressively if they choose to do so) with or without a referendum victory.  

This dichotomy is also problematic due to the fact it transforms the AKP supporters into one unified group, and that their voting “Yes” is a confirmation of their support for a full-blown dictatorship. Admittedly, there are strong political and security arguments why someone might support the constitutional changes. However, in the current political atmosphere, the vote could only polarize the electorate.

On the flip side, this dichotomy robs the multiple oppositions of any agency whatsoever, as if their strong resistance to Erdogan is completely inept and that they are doomed to live under a fascist dictatorship, in which the only hope for them is leaving their homeland.

So, no, it is not game-over for those who oppose Erdogan. Yesterday’s Erdogan is no different than today’s Erdogan, save for the fact that he has received a strong message that, at least for now, his popularity has dwindled and that his popularity has maxed out at not much more than 50 percent of the population. This is not likely to change in the near future, and if Erdogan does make note of the dynamic changes within the Turkish electorate, he might even lose his bid for presidency in the 2019 elections, never having the chance to rule with super-presidential powers accorded to him in the referendum.

For the opposition, the arrests of protesters taking part in post-referendum protests, with one even being charged with “delegitimizing the “Yes” victory", the referendum is not a turning point but rather a continuation of “more of the same.” The victory of capturing Istanbul, where almost 25 percent of the overall Turkish population resides, together with the belief that the vote was stolen, has emboldened them for now, showing that they are very much alive. True, this most likely will not continue, in which case, silent resistance to Erdogan’s power will return, as the risk of arrest outweighs the urge to take to the streets.

Like Erdogan, who needs to reassess his base, the opposition groups need to as well. Will Meral Aksener be able to form a successful party that will replace Bahceli’s MHP, providing a new path for the nationalist opposition? Will a center-right party emerge from former AKP members challenging Erdogan? Will the secular CHP be able to reach out to new groups, create fronts, which will be able to break their normal 25-27 percent of the overall vote in parliamentary elections? Will these parties create a dynamic where the mostly Kurdish leftist HDP can remain a relevant party in light of the mass arrests that have taken place during the last almost two years? These questions are just a few of many pressing questions that could prove a challenge to Erdogan and his AKP party in the future. 

It is for these reasons that the referendum victory of the AKP should not be seen as a turning point but rather a continuation of the standoff between Erdogan’s AKP and different oppositional forces, one that unfortunately promises more instability, a continued sluggish economy, and frustration among those who do not see eye-to-eye with Erdogan and his hard-core supporters.

Nevertheless, one only need to look at Turkey’s shaky history to understand that just as its jails have revolving doors, new political systems, such as the post-referendum constitutional changes, can also be discarded over time. While many can predict what Turkey might look like in two years, what it might look like in a decade is still very unclear. While the path and determination of Erdogan is clear, the opposition could splinter further while the jockeying continues for its leadership, which may result in a force weakened even further and incapable of any real challenge to the newly empowered president.

This article appeared in Haaretz on April 24, 2017, under the longer title of: Wounded but Alive: It's Not Yet Game Over for Turkey's Democracy - or Its Resistance. Click here for the link. 




























*Wounded but Alive: It's Not Yet Game Over for Turkey's Democracy - or Its Resistance

Elegy for Turkey, Now a One-party State*

Haaretz: "The grotesque sight of parliamentarians being dragged into police cars, mouths covered by the hands of the security forces, is the latest sign that [Turkey]...is reaching a point of no return."

In late night raids last Thursday (November 4) , Turkish security forces rounded the heads of the mostly Kurdish HDP party and 11 of its Members of Parliament. The government accused them of an array of charges alleging membership in, or support of, the outlawed Kurdish PKK terrorist organization. The two leaders, Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, are now officially under arrest and in prison awaiting trial. 

With the recent sequence of aggressive government clampdowns, it would be a lie to say that many in Turkey were surprised at the arrests. Just last week, the HDP co-mayors of Diyarbakir, including a former MP, Gultan Kisanak, were also arrested. However even for seasoned observers already used to the Erdogan government’s accelerated post-coup authoritarianism, the speed and manner of the operation to arrest the HDP leaders was nonetheless shocking. The sight of lawmakers being forced into police cars, at times pushed around by security officials young enough to be their children, was a grotesque show of force. One former MP, Sebahat Tuncel, was literally dragged and gagged while being detained at a protest.

With the arrests, Turkey has erased this summer’s sympathy and support, not least internationally, following the ruthless attempt a group of army officers to take down the state on the night of July 15, bombing the country’s parliament and shooting down hundreds of civilians who were defending its country’s democracy. Internationally, and despite fears by many that Turkey was already well on its way to turning into an authoritarian state, the Turkish government’s slate was wiped clean and it was in effect given a window of time to “clean house.” 

Inside Turkey, in the attempted coup’s immediate aftermath, it had seemed that a new found unity between Turkey’s religiously-oriented AKP-led government and the CHP, the major secular opposition party, might lead the country on a new path: of stability and hope for change. 

However, following the post-coup purges, which have left over 100,000 citizens fired from jobs in the private and public sectors and almost 40,000 arrested, those among the opposition who had supported the summer’s unity slowly started to realize that what they had imagined as a new beginning was merely a passing midsummer delusion. The Wall Street Journal has termed these collective events as "the largest mass purge the world has seen in decades."

This feeling has only been exacerbated by the fact that the purges are extending far beyond the Gulenists—followers of the U.S.-exiled Fethullah Gulen, blamed for the coup attempt—to include diverse opposition voices as well as harsh critics of the government. 

It was reported that among last week's purge of academics, some signatories of the January 2016 pro-peace petition have been sacked. One outspoken human rights activist and world renowned author, Asli Erdogan, has been under arrest for over two months as well. At the same time, a recent decree has targeted the autonomy of Turkish academia by cancelling the election of rectors by universities themselves. Now the head of each university will be appointed directly by the president, from among candidates chosen by the government-appointed Council of Higher Education. 

Then, early last week, the secular newspaper Cumhuriyet, the closest press organization to the opposition CHP (the same party that supported national unity after the coup) was raided, with its Editor-in-Chief detained along with twelve other executives and journalists and staff members. Included among those rounded up is Kadri Gursel, a well-seasoned and mainstream journalist. The clear message from the government was: Everyone is within our reach and we can shut you down too, if needed, just as we forced the closure of 15 other media outlets just days before. Those outlets are part of a total of a 130 media outlets forbidden to broadcast or print in Turkey. 

It is important also to remember that aside from the famous journalist, authors, musicians, and politicians detained or arrested, there are many more ordinary citizens who have been deemed guilty by association and rounded up. 

As in previous crackdowns, they’re especially hard to keep track of: they lack the name recognition or specific affiliation which attracts the attention that facilitates keeping track of the progress of the charges against them; Turkey has famously untransparent procedures regarding their treatment or trials. We can only imagine how many innocent people have been caught up.   

Turkey seems to be quite close to the critical threshold where other countries will simply write it off. The barrage of bad news is just too much to absorb. Where news stories about Turkey use to excite interest, today, I imagine most readers of the international press don’t even bother to read them. The country that for so many years captured their attention and led them to visit, study and even move there, and invest in it. The Turkish government is caused extreme damage to the country’s image, a degradation that will take years, if not decades, to reverse. 

In fact, just last week, the United States ordered consulate staff families in Istanbul to leave the city due to fears of an ISIS orchestrated attack against Americans. Just a week before that the U.S. State Department warned Americans they could be subject to attack or kidnapping in Istanbul by “extremist groups,” such as ISIS. These warnings confirm a deep and telling lack of trust in the Turkish security apparatus by Western intelligence agencies. 

As someone who led educational trips to Turkey, can I honestly take international students there now? With what can I convince academic colleagues to bring groups to a place where the freedom of speech they enjoy and uphold is disappearing, where newspaper editors and parliament members are being arrested and media outlets are shut down on a whim? 

It would be wrong to ascribe all Turkey’s problems to the coup attempt and its aftermath. But rather than using a rare moment of unity to push forward a new agenda, its government has set it back on a path of continued turmoil. However, Turkey’s democracy and civil society won’t be rescued by another round of scathing criticism, from the U.S. or by the European Union, which has already demonstrated its disinterest in prioritizing democratic freedoms over a deal keeping Syrian refugees in at bay from Europe. 

The answers to Turkey’s problems can only be found inside Turkey. If its government adamantly continues on this dangerous path of usurping power, it won’t only be the opposition who will face an unrecognizable homeland. It will also be the fate of government members, blindly marching forward in an insatiable hunt for more power, who, in their quest to rule the country, are tearing the country apart at the seams. 

*This appeared in Haaretz on November 6, 2016. Click here for the link.  

Turkey's desperate need to reconcile with Israel (following Istiklal Blast)*

Haaretz: “The ruling AKP party, used to sanctioning extreme anti-Israeli rhetoric and even blatant anti-Semitism, has condemned the anti-Israeli hate tweet of a party activist after the Istanbul bombing. It's is a sign of how actively Turkey is now courting Israel.”

Louis Fishman March 20, 2016

Saturday morning, a suicide bomber blew himself up on Istiklal, Istanbul’s main pedestrian avenue. An Israeli group on a culinary tour of the city took the main force of the explosion, in what appears to be a random act directed at tourists, and not specifically at them as Israelis. Three Israeli citizens were killed and eleven injured, in addition to an Iranian who succumbed to fatal injuries; a Turkish family, including a two year old toddler and her father, were hospitalized in serious condition. 

This is the fourth bomb to go off in Turkey in the last two months which cumulatively have killed over 80 people. Two bombs have hit tourists in Istanbul, with those attacks believed linked to ISIS sympathizers, and the two recent Ankara bombings directed at Turkish citizens were claimed by TAK, a militant Kurdish organization, an offshoot of the outlawed PKK, whose most recent bombing happened just a week ago killing 37 people. Last October, an ISIS sympathizer killed over a hundred people at a leftist pro-peace rally in Ankara as well.  

Saturday's bombing sadly did not come as a surprise: The American and German embassies had issued warnings, with many Turkish citizens themselves avoiding Istiklal for fear of an imminent attack. 

Immediately following the attack on Saturday, Turkey’s social media was saturated with misinformation, including claims that another bomb had been detonated in Istanbul’s upscale neighborhood of Nisantasi. Very soon rumors began to emerge that among the injured was a group of Israelis. At first, this seemed far-fetched, since even before the 2010 Gaza Flotilla incident and the breakdown of Israeli-Turkish relations, Israeli groups and tourists are rarely seen in Istanbul outside of its airport, which serves as a major hub onwards for Israeli travelers. 

Upon hearing that Israelis were among the injured, Irem Aktas, a low-ranking member of AKP who headed one of Istanbul’s AKP women’s branches and a declared Erdogan fan, tweeted that she wished death upon the Israelis injured. The hateful tweet took off like wildfire, retweeted by Turks disgusted by her words, and migrating quickly to the international press; not surprisingly, her sentiments received some praise as well. 

However, unlike past incidents, when extreme anti-Israeli rhetoric, often bleeding into blatant anti-Semitism, has not only been sanctioned but at times even coopted by AKP government officials and their zealous supporters, this time – commendably - party officials came out strongly against Aktas. She now faces disciplinary action and possible dismissal from the party. 

This move by the AKP comes at a time when Turkey and Israel have been putting serious efforts at renewing ties. Last January, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who until recently never missed an opportunity to publically disgrace Israel, shocked many when he stated that it is not just Israel that needs Turkey but “we also need Israel.” In fact, during the last few months Turkey has made numerous statements that makes it appears almost as if it is courting Israel. 

Turkey’s reconciliation with Israel has more to do with geopolitics than a new found love for the Jewish state. Since relations between the two countries went sour, Turkey has lost most of its regional clout. This is true in Syria where it has lost a great deal of its influence and, following the downing of the Russian jet last October, a new need for natural gas arose, which Israel is able to answer. Lastly, Turkey’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia—an unspoken ally of Israel—also came at a cost, while its relations with Egypt are still strained.    

Domestically, as a diversion from clamping down on opposition voices and the seizing of media outlets, cutting a deal with Israel would give it much needed credit with Washington. This is of the utmost importance now also due to Turkey’s renewed war in its own backyard, as it takes on the PKK in the southeastern Kurdish populated regions, which has led to flagrant human rights violations and death of innocent civilians (with hundreds of dead among Turkey's own forces). 

Last night, during a press briefing related to the bombing, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was asked about the talks between Turkey and Israel. He took a very diplomatic stance, stating “We have encountered some delays in this process, not from a lack of trying but due to fundamental issues,” and that the goal was to reach “normalization.” Netanyahu also commented on Aktas’ tweet, calling it “outrageous,” and stating that he received assurances that action would be taken against her.

Even if the major stumbling block standing in the way of Turkish-Israeli reconciliation seems to relate to the Gaza blockade, it could also be a key to the solution. Israel isn't budging on Turkey’s demand to lift the blockade, but it might be leaning towards a partial lifting to satisfy Turkish demands, and in return Israel could plausibly demand guarantees that the Turkish government stop using Israel as its public punching bag and take steps at combatting anti-Semitism within its ranks. In that sense, perhaps Saturday’s bombing could be a turning point in relations.  

An agreement would also allow Turkey, if it really was interested, to invest in the West Bank and Gaza, and to begin to take real steps at making Palestinian lives better in place of the usual empty rhetoric. Nevertheless, the bombing once again highlights the fact that it is actually Turkey that now is in desperate need of renewed relations with Israel, while Israel has time on its side, knowing that in the current situation in Turkey, relations between the two countries only can remain limited in scope, or at least until some stability returns. 

For now, unfortunately, any hope for Israeli tourism to Turkey as a step towards normalization will have to be put on hold as well, not least due to the Israel foreign ministry's travel advisory warning against travel to Turkey. Sadly, the Israeli group who set out Saturday to discover Turkish culture and food became a part of a dangerous sequence of violence in a country over its head in grave issues that leaves no one untouched.  

This article appeared in Haaretz on March 20, 2016, click here for link

BDS Against a Repressive Turkey: Coming Soon?*

Haaretz: "The government's seizure of Zaman, the largest Turkish daily newspaper, is the latest episode in a state-sponsored campaign to silence dissent. And PR stardust won't be able to cover it up."

Louis Fishman Mar 06, 2016 

American television audiences recently have been privy to a growing number of Turkish Airlines commercials which were screened during the evenings of the Superbowl and the star-studded Hollywood Oscar awards. These were not your normal airline commercial. Rather, they were an advert for the upcoming superhero feature movie Batman v Superman, of which Turkish Airlines is a sponsor. The ads 'offer' passengers imaginary trips to the cities of Gotham and Metropolis.

The upcoming March release of the movie is aimed at reversing Turkey’s tourism tough times. Terrorist attacks have wiped the shine off the country's image: the suicide bombing in the heart of Istanbul in January targeted tourists (10 German visitors were killed), while tourism to the coastal city of Antalya—a magnet for Russian tourists—has dwindled following Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet  last October. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Antalya, desperate for the state to intervene, suggested the government step up and invite Madonna, Jennifer Lopez, even Justin Bieber, to lure tourists back.

However, Turkey’s problems are much greater than just convincing tourists to keep coming. Since regaining a parliamentary majority in November, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his obedient Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, seem to be doing their utmost to lead Turkey into darker times.  

Journalists carry an injured woman after Turkish riot-police used tear gas to disperse supporters in front of the headquarters of Turkish daily newspaper Zaman, Istanbul, March 5, 2016AFP

Proof of this came again this past weekend. On Friday, the state seized the opposition media outlet Zaman, which is identified with the Gulen movement, his sworn rivals, evicting its employees from their offices, and taking over its building with brutal police force.

Within 24 hours Turkey’s largest daily had its chief editor replaced by a pro-government state appointed trustee . The AKP government is now one step closer to completely silencing all criticism. This goes beyond the press: almost 2000 cases have been opened against individuals for the crime of insulting the president.   

Turkey’s leaders' obsessional silencing of their critics could, though, now have reached a peak level that can only damage them. The ruling AKP worked hard to build its strong international image during most of the first decade following the year 2000. But the government's targeting of academics (both Turkish and international)  who dare to speak out against the Turkish state's war against its civilian population as part of its conflict with the PKK has outraged the world, though the outcry has been less intense regarding the actual, harsh human rights violations committed by the Turkish state itself in that war.   

Responding to the government crackdown on academics, the Middle East Students Association (MESA) issued two statements calling on the Turkish government to “take note of mounting international condemnation of the erosion of democratic rights and freedoms in Turkey, particularly in connection with the tendency of public prosecutors to intimidate political opponents and academic critics through abuses of the powers of criminal investigation and prosecution.” 

And just two weeks ago the International Political Science Association (IPSA) suddenly cancelled their 2016 summer World Congress scheduled to take place in Istanbul, relocating to an as yet-unannounced European city. True, IPSA stated that the cancellation was due to the “deterioration of the security situation in Turkey and the region.”

However, it went on to highlight this decision was also made since it could not “provide an environment favorable to the exchange of intellectual ideas.” That sent a strong message that the cancellation related to the government's repression of freedom of thought at Turkish universities.

If that wasn't enough, last week thirty professors at Columbia University called on its president Lee Bollinger to denounce the recent suppression of academics in Turkey. They also called on Bollinger to suspend activities of its Istanbul-based global center if Turkey continues to take steps against academics. It seems unlikely at this point that their call will trigger action. But Bollinger will face more pressure if the situation deteriorates for the university's own academics.

Only a few weeks ago he declared to students that, in the case of Istanbul or any of the international Columbia branches, "If they start restricting [our] academic freedom … we’re done. We’re out of there. We close shop. We can be out in a number of days. We can be out in 24 hours.”

Such examples should send a strong signal to Turkey that if it does not reconsider the ethical and legal justness of its actions it will face more sanctions and further isolation. Just as Israel is challenged daily by the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, Turkey could face a growing and concerted opposition among university students, academia, and leftist movements abroad.

However, just as in Israel, voluntary international sanctions could have the reverse effect that the activists intend: strengthening the government’s hold over its electorate through reactionary politics, isolating internal voices of change amidst a failed opposition.     

What is clear however is that even glamorous PR can't hide broken and ugly realities, neither stuffing Oscar swagbags with a luxury free trip to Israel nor featuring your national airline in a major motion picture.  Turkey is hitting such a low state of affairs that even Superman or Batman can't save the country, much less Justin Bieber

*This article appeared in Haaretz on March 6, 2106. Click here for article.

Shock Waves From Syria Intensify Turkey’s Chaotic Times* (From December 2015)

Last Saturday, on the streets of the Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, Turkey’s renowned human rights lawyer and head of the city’s bar association, Tahir Elci, himself a Kurd, was murdered straight after an outdoor press conference he had held. Hours later, a video emerged of the gun battle, in which concealed attackers fired at Elci and people standing around him. It’s not clear whether he was shot right before, during, or after the gun battle. What was missing from the video was a clear picture of him actually being shot, leaving us only with a glimpse of Elci dead on the ground with a pistol lying next to him. The incident also left two policemen dead, with the perpetrators escaping free.

Regardless of who was actually responsible for his killing, Elci’s assassination - or his death as a result of being caught in crossfire - serves as a metaphor of the chaotic times with which Turkey has become all too familiar.

In fact, last week, just as the newly elected AKP Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu presented his government to the parliament, the country was thrown into a whirlwind of events. From the Turkish Air Force’s downing of the Russian jet, to the arrest of Turkey’s main opposition newspaper’s editor, and the killing of Elci, Turkey watchers have been overwhelmed with non-stop headlines.  

While seemingly unconnected, these events are all somehow related to the greater question of Turkish policy in Syria (even if not solely). With the war progressing into its fifth year, shock waves are continually being felt in Turkey, both domestically and internationally.

The Russian jet shot down, on November 24, 2015. Credit: Reuters.

The shooting down of a Russian jet fighter over Syria caught all by surprise; however, in retrospect, it seems to have been a calculated action, meant to draw red lines for Russian involvement in Syria. Turkey was motivated by a determination to retain one of its last strongholds of influence in Syria and a buffer zone to prevent a Kurdish military presence there. Until now, Turkey has done its utmost at preventing Syria’s Kurdish forces from moving into this region, which would give them an autonomous and contiguous block situated along most of its southern border. However, now with Russia bombing its Turkmen allies, Turkey is in danger of losing influential territory to Syrian President Bashar Assad’s army, a worst-case scenario.

This week also saw the jailing of Can Dundar, one of Turkey’s most influential journalists who serves as the editor-in-chief of the opposition daily Cumhuriyet, together with his journalist colleague, Erdem Gul. They were arrested on trumped-up charges of espionage as a result of their front-page story about a secret arms transfer to rebel groups in Syria. The Turkish government had claimed the shipment was humanitarian aid destined for Syria’s Turkmen community.

This wasn’t actually a new story: it first broke in January 2014, less than a month after massive corruption charges connected to then-prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his government. Certainly, Dundar and Gul were not the first journalists to write about the arms delivery. However, their reignition of the debate last May, just days before general elections, hit at the heart of Erdogan’s Syrian soft spot, with speculation that these arms could even have been making their way to ISIS. This led Erdogan at the time to vow publically that he would punish Dundar for his newspaper’s actions. The irony of their arrest just last Thursday is that only days before, Erdogan bragged that it really did not matter if it was an arms transfer or not, begging the question why he was still so keen to put them in jail to await trial.

The significance of the jailing of such prominent journalists is that Erdogan is ready and willing to take on anyone within Turkey challenging his plans to take an active role on his terms in a post-Assad Syria. This determination can quite easily take the form of a personal vendetta for Erdogan, who won’t forget or forgive what he considers acts of disloyalty, even if the payback comes with a time lag.

Lastly, the killing of Elci can also been seen within the context of Turkish policy in Syria. The murder is representative of the chaos that has become part of the daily life of southeast Turkey’s Kurdish citizens since they largely split with the ruling AKP over the future of Syria. Last year’s peace talks between Erdogan and the PKK and the nation’s Kurds went astray when the two camps entrenched their loyalties into opposing camps. The Kurds, together with leftist Turks, formed the People’s Democratic Party, the HDP, a grassroots movement inherently connected to the social and political revolution of the Syrian Kurds across the border. 

The 2014 battle of Kobane, in which Syrian Kurds (including volunteer fighters from leftist groups in Turkey) and ISIS (ironically also including volunteers from Turkey) fought just meters from Turkey’s border, positioned the HDP in opposition to Erdogan’s attempts to block Kurdish expansion and self-defense. This led to claims that he was secretly supporting ISIS (in a variation of the ‘enemy’s enemy’ stratagem) , a position that was seemingly proven in Kurdish eyes by Erdogan’s apparent acceptance that Kobane would eventually fall to ISIS, and that Turkey shouldn’t intervene to prevent it happening.  

The hatred between the ruling party and the pro-Kurdish party grew and grew. When the HDP’s grassroots support translated into a first-ever electoral win in the general elections in June, the peace process went off the rails, and these days PKK and Turkish forces are entrenched in daily fighting.

Not surprisingly, Elci was killed minutes after he called for peace between the Turkish state and the PKK. Just minutes before his death he declared: "We do not want guns, clashes and operations here." It was a scenario with ghastly similarities to last month’s Ankara suicide bombing of mostly pro-HDP demonstrators for peace, allegedly by pro-ISIS operatives, which left over 100 dead.  

It was clear that Elci himself at the least felt he was a marked man. He was a clear opponent of the Turkish government and had recently spoken of credible threats against his life, especially following his appearance on CNN Turk earlier this year, when he stated that the outlawed Kurdish Workers’ Party, the PKK, “is not a terrorist organization. Rather, it is an armed political organization which has large local support.” This led to him being detained and released pending trial for spreading terrorist propaganda, with a hefty fine served on the television station.

While these recent events might lead some to argue that Turkey is certainly in over its head, its prime minister, Davutoglu, has proven to all that he and Erdogan are able to balance this intrinsic instability with glimmers of hope.

On Sunday, Davutoglu signed a comprehensive agreement with the European Union to receive 3 billion euros in return for keeping Syrian refugees tight and as far away from Europe as possible. Other major perks might come with this, such as visa-free entry into the EU for Turkish citizens, and the EU renewing Turkey’s hope of one day entering the union. For Turkey the timing could not have been better, offsetting the proposed Russian sanctions against Turkey, with wall-to-wall support from within NATO as well

On the other hand, for those journalists jailed in Turkey, or those who thought that Europe would speak out against human rights violations in Turkey’s southeastern regions, increasingly subjected to long military curfews and fighting in the streets, they shouldn’t hold their breath.

*This article appeared in Haaretz on December 1, 2105. Click here for the article.

Recap of Turkish Local Elections: the Winners and the Losers*

Vote counting in a poll station in Tuzluçayir - Ankara; © 2014 - Piero Castellano

Last Sunday evening, from my home in Istanbul, I anxiously watched television exit polls to see if there would be any surprises concerning the Turkish local election results, even if I knew this would be unlikely. As ballot boxes started to open, it was clear there would be no major surprises. Turkish voters had once again given the AKP the strong lead they needed to declare victory, sweeping in most of the state's municipalities. [For background reading see following link] 

This was good news for the embattled Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who declared this election, as all other elections, a referendum on his performance. However, this time the stakes were much higher following last summer's Gezi Park protests, and the December 17 corruption probe, which linked him, his family, and government ministers, to massive corruption. In fact, he was subjected to a campaign, where numerous secret recordings emerged which revealed his shady business deals, and his continued meddling in the media. As a result, Erdogan struck back by banning both Twitter and Youtube, where these recordings were being shared. 

 People blocking policemen, elections officials inside of a school in
Seyranbaglari  - Ankara to prevent theft or destruction of ballots 2014 - Piero Castellano

Overall, while some expected Erdogan would be punished for corruption, this did not happen and perhaps should not be a surprise. A few months before the elections, I was lucky to have taken part in a lecture by Professor Ali Akarca, an University of Illinois professor, who works on comparative voting patterns. According to Akarca, in local elections, the incumbent party loses on average of 5%  from the previous parliamentary elections, and often voters do not change their vote solely based on the fact if a politician is corrupt. In fact, just days before the election, in an interview with Bugun newspaper, Akarca explained that if AKP gets over 42%, it will be clear the corruption charges would not be the reason behind decline in support, and would be most likely related to one's economic state. 

The final results are as follows: Erdogan’s AKP party received between 43-45% of the vote; the main opposition CHP raked in between 26-28%, while the nationalist MHP received between 16-18%; finally, the Kurdish BDP consolidated their votes in the Southeastern Kurdish regions with a total between 4-5%. 

A look at the maps below will show that the distribution of municipalities did not radically change from 2009 to 2014. The interior remains overall conservative-voting overwhelmingly for the AKP; the coastal regions, which are noticeably more liberal, voting for the CHP. Also, the distribution of MHP municipalities remained overall the same. Lastly, and obvious , is the fact that the Kurdish party remains strictly confined to the Southeastern region.

2009 local elections (based on municipalities)

In 2009 Map Blue=DSP (closet to CHP), Dark Blue= BBP (Nationalist party that broke away from MHP)

2014 Elections (Hurriyet)

Yellow=AKP, Red=CHP, Maroon=MHP, Blue=BDP, Grey=Independent Kurdish

Of course, the million-dollar question is how much were these numbers altered due to election rigging/fraud. Just days before the election, Professor Erik Tillman of DePaul University predicted a AKP victory of between 42-45%, which would be due to numerous factors, including election fraud. According to Tillman, the "Erdogan government has demonstrated a willingness to subvert the rule of law to increase its power and get its way. Unless you truly believe that Erdogan considers elections to be too sacred to corrupt, then you would have to expect him to continue the same behavior." 

It seems that Tillman was not so far off, with numerous or reports coming in of election fraud; such claims, became more critical in cities like Turkey's capital, Ankara, where it seems highly reasonable that without election rigging, the four-time AKP incumbent Melih Gokcek of Ankara, would have lost to the CHP candidate Mansur Yavas. In a post-election blog, Tillman tackles the question of electoral fraud in Ankara, and also looks at the work of Professor Eric Meyersson, an economist at Stockholm School of Economics, whose post-election analysis of electoral fraud in Ankara went viral. 

In fact, as I write this, almost a week after the elections, more ballots have been found in trash bins in Ankara, and despite this, all attempts of a recount have been denied by its election board. A similar case also exists in Antalya, where a recount has been blocked. Interestingly enough, while the CHP is unsuccessful at getting recounts, the AKP, in one district (Agri), has received a total of 15 recounts. 

 TOMA water cannon attacks crowd who gathered outside the Election Board Offices on Mithatpasa cd - Ankara, as they take shelter in the nearby Social Security building  © 2014 - Piero Castellano

Despite the allegations of fraud however, it should made clear that these cases seemed not to have radically changed the overall picture of the Turkish electorate's "national will," and was an attempt to keep the AKP's comfortable lead. Nevertheless, future research will be necessary to reach any sound conclusions.

In short, the post-elections situation is as follows: the local Turkish elections only reconfirms the extreme polarization of the Turkish electorate and in some sense will lead to the "same-old." On one hand, Erdogan will continue to consolidate powers and silencing dissent at all costs, while large parts of the opposition forces will continue to fight for their rights, being met with large doses of teargas and bans. In other words, with presidential elections ahead in August, and parliamentary ones, perhaps being moved from 2015 to the summer as well, Turkey still has a rocky-road to some political calmness. For a more analysis on the elections, I recommend looking at Selim Sazak's piece: Turkey: Atop a Power-Keg.        

The Winner and the Losers: 

Winners: 

Recep Tayyip Erdogan: He undoubtedly has retained his power despite a huge onslaught of leaked tapes and consistent world criticism. In fact, while the secret recordings that were emerging were certainly damning, exposing wide-spread corruption, it seems that the sheer numbers of tapes being released backfired, overwhelming the electorate. It seems likely that if Erdogan decides to run for the presidency, he will easily succeed in winning if he is able to convince the BDP to support his bid. Of course, Erdogan will most likely only run for president if he succeeds in transferring powers to the president, in a "putinization" of the Turkish system.

Peace and Democratic Party (BDP):

The Kurdish party, which is voicing demands of autonomy in Southeastern Kurdish regions, could not have envisioned a better outcome. Just a look on the map will show that they have secured a clear geographical block on the map.  While it seems hard to imagine that they will be able to secure the release of the jailed PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, or receive limited autonomy, this too will be a continued demand. With presidential elections in the forecast, their vote will be crucial for an Erodgan victory. It is still too early to see if the peace process will be a winner or a loser, as I will explain below.   

Mansur Yavas: A former member of the MHP, Yavas switched to CHP, running as the mayoral candidate for Ankara. Due to election fraud, he will probably not serve as mayor, even though there is a strong chance that he is the actual winner. He has inspired many, showed leadership, and if he plays his cards correctly, he is in a key position to lead a coalition against the AKP's continued hegemony.  

Losers:

National Will: In elections, every vote counts; in a civil society, voting is the highest form of participation. It is holy. By the election board blocking CHP's calls for a recount in such cities as Ankara, where serious claims have been made, it is clear that the greatest loser is the "milli irade," (national will).  By blocking a recount, it is clear that the national will only belongs to the victors, and the ones in power who can manipulate due process. Is justice for all too big of a demand?


CHP: Failing to reach 30% of the vote, its leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu will need to do some serious soul-searching. Only early parliamentary elections, which could come together with this summer's presidental elections, might save him; simply, due to the fact that a change in party leadership with so little time could do more damage than good. It seems likely that only a young dynamic leader will be able to bring this party to over 30% of the national vote.  

Mustafa Sarigul: While he carried out a good campaign as CHP candidate in Istanbul, it seems that CHP party members should get the message that if he attempts to get the leadership of the party, this will spell more loses for the CHP in the future. Sarigul is not the answer.

HDP: If the BDP thought that Sirri Sureyya Onder and Sebahat Tuncel would be able to create a left coalition that would offer a "third-way" in Istanbul, and other western regions of Turkey, they were flat wrong. I could be mistaken, but Onder's political career could be on the line; while, Tuncel seems that she will be able to survive this election failure. Placing their numbers aside, it just seems that they were not able to capture the imagination of potential voters, and even served keeping the AKP in power in such local municipalities as Beyoglu. 

Winner or loser? Too early to tell: 

The peace process: While the AKP has made serious steps at progressing Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation, through talks with jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, this process could be a loser. Unfortunately, due to Erdogan's polarizing politics, the fate of the process seems tied to his success. If he runs for president, he most likely will not be able to secure 50% of the vote without the support of the BDP, which will come with some heavy demands. In other words, the process will continue to be tied to behind-closed-door political deals and not a reconciliation process between Turkish and Kurdish populations, which certainly could backfire.  

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 *My special thanks to Piero Castellano, a photo-journalist who resides in Ankara for providing the photos! He can be followed on twitter at @pierocastellano

Some thoughts on Turkey’s “Parallel State” and Corruption

Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has recently been marketing a new term for Turkish public consumption: the “Parallel State.” This of course is a term that bears a striking resemblance to the familiar term, the “Deep State,” which describes the once anti-democratic forces within the Turkish establishment that prevented the will of the people from being realized, achieving this through violent means such as assassinations and extrajudicial killings of Kurds. The deep state (derin devlet) of course, went hand-in-hand with Turkey’s history of coups, and the grasp the military once had over the state institutions, with its fate being sealed with the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials.

Following the unfolding of the events of the December 17 corruption probe, Erdogan was quick to attribute the probe as a work of the parallel state (paralel devlet). In other words, a new “state within the state,” had emerged within the Turkish bureaucracy, and the corruption probe was nothing less than a blatant attempt to topple his government. In fact, as far as Erdogan was concerned, this did not begin with the corruption probe, but actually with the Gezi Park protests. In his New Year’s Eve message, Erdogan stated that “In May 2013 when everything was going well, both domestic and external powers, which were jealous of our successes, started the Gezi protests and attacked the nation's hopes and the future and independence of our country. This movement was followed by a plot started on Dec. 17.”

Defining the parallel state however was much easier than the underground shady forces of the deep state, since from the beginning there was only one culprit: the once staunch ally of the AKP, the Gulen movement. Despite that tensions between Erdogan and the Gulenist movement became evident a few years back, its spiritual leader, the self-exiled religious preacher, Fethullah Gulen, never pulled his support for the government; however, during the last few months, as Erdogan took steps to consolidate his power within his party, the two camps seemed set on a course of collision, which hit new heights right before the breaking of the corruption probe.  

While there is a kernel of truth concerning the Gulenists' influence within state institutions (as I wrote in Haaretz), what is lacking in the parallel state thesis is that the Gulen movement has showed no signs of wanting to take power away from the AKP. In fact, up until a month ago, their main newspaper, Zaman, one of Turkey’s largest dailies, was still publishing pro-government op-eds, even if its editorial staff had grown more critical following the Gezi protests.

The claim that the movement was attempting to topple Erdogan, in what has been coined as a “judicial coup,” on the surface seems ludicrous; if the Gulenists had no plans to take the reins of the state, or did not support a power to replace the AKP, then what kind of coup is this? And, if Erdogan saw them as such a great threat, then why did he work hand-in-hand with them for the last eleven years, allowing them to become an integral part of the party’s makeup. If anything, Erdogan is a political genius; he clearly is not naïve.

Of course, this leads us to the main question, whether or not the Gulenists only crime (from the perspective of the AKP) was withdrawing its support from the government? Or, perhaps, was it due to the simple fact that Erdogan could not stand any criticism whatsoever, which the Gulen movement was increasingly voicing concerning both domestic and foreign affairs?

The Turkish government knows how to strike back against its opponents and it certainly has. Without any judicial process, hundreds of police and government officials (including prosecutors), believed by many as followers of Gulen, have been removed from their positions, threatening the existence of the rule of law. The weeding out process that we are witnessing appears strikingly similar to the February 28 process, also known as the 1997 “post-modern” coup d’état, when religious Turkish citizens, including many current AKP members, were removed one-by-one from public institutions due to the demands of the once strong secular establishment.  

While Erdogan continues to call foul play, few can deny that the claims of corruption, which on the surface seem to be evident. This was so eloquently expressed by Cuneyt Ozdemir in his weekend article in the Turkish newspaper, Radikal.  According to Ozdemir, most of those accused of receiving bribes or gifts (including government ministers) have yet to deny it; however, the same answer to accusations is repeated over and over again: this is the work of the parallel state! He then goes and highlights the need to separate the two accusations: bribes and corruption are one thing; while, the struggle against parallel state is another, reiterating that if there is such a parallel state it should be investigated accordingly.

What I will add is that until now the government has been unable to present little-if any-evidence of such a parallel state, even if there is no doubt that two camps are involved in a bitter fight. And, even if the government does find the “smoking-gun” that they are endlessly searching for, the recent curbing of judicial powers to obstruct further investigations into corruption affairs, much less the targeting of peoples’ careers based on belonging to a certain sect, is worrying to say the least.

Lastly, a strange twist has emerged from this discovery of the “parallel state.” Erdogan, and the Turkish government, has signaled their support for the retrial of army officers and citizens convicted in the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, as a result of claims that they were unjustly judged by this newly founded parallel state.

Regardless if one agrees with the convictions (numerous legal experts continue to voice concern of the special court’s judicial transparency), the fact that Erdogan is willing to allow a retrial of these convicts shows just how upside down Turkish politics have become. Imagine the impossible: the ones accused of being the deep state will be retried due to the injustice done to them by the parallel state. The fact that AKP is willing to reverse what they considered their greatest victory in order to cover up the corruption within the government is a travesty.

Lastly, if Erdogan expects to find new friends from this political maneuvering, he will most likely be mistaken. What seems clear is he will likely be opening a new can of worms, which will add to the already growing instability of the Turkish political scene. Let us not forget, for many jailed in Silivri, some who might even be released pending retrial, as far as they are concerned, there is only one parallel state, and that is Erdogan and the AKP apparatus that landed them behind bars.