Elegy for Turkey, Now a One-party State*

Haaretz: "The grotesque sight of parliamentarians being dragged into police cars, mouths covered by the hands of the security forces, is the latest sign that [Turkey]...is reaching a point of no return."

In late night raids last Thursday (November 4) , Turkish security forces rounded the heads of the mostly Kurdish HDP party and 11 of its Members of Parliament. The government accused them of an array of charges alleging membership in, or support of, the outlawed Kurdish PKK terrorist organization. The two leaders, Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, are now officially under arrest and in prison awaiting trial. 

With the recent sequence of aggressive government clampdowns, it would be a lie to say that many in Turkey were surprised at the arrests. Just last week, the HDP co-mayors of Diyarbakir, including a former MP, Gultan Kisanak, were also arrested. However even for seasoned observers already used to the Erdogan government’s accelerated post-coup authoritarianism, the speed and manner of the operation to arrest the HDP leaders was nonetheless shocking. The sight of lawmakers being forced into police cars, at times pushed around by security officials young enough to be their children, was a grotesque show of force. One former MP, Sebahat Tuncel, was literally dragged and gagged while being detained at a protest.

With the arrests, Turkey has erased this summer’s sympathy and support, not least internationally, following the ruthless attempt a group of army officers to take down the state on the night of July 15, bombing the country’s parliament and shooting down hundreds of civilians who were defending its country’s democracy. Internationally, and despite fears by many that Turkey was already well on its way to turning into an authoritarian state, the Turkish government’s slate was wiped clean and it was in effect given a window of time to “clean house.” 

Inside Turkey, in the attempted coup’s immediate aftermath, it had seemed that a new found unity between Turkey’s religiously-oriented AKP-led government and the CHP, the major secular opposition party, might lead the country on a new path: of stability and hope for change. 

However, following the post-coup purges, which have left over 100,000 citizens fired from jobs in the private and public sectors and almost 40,000 arrested, those among the opposition who had supported the summer’s unity slowly started to realize that what they had imagined as a new beginning was merely a passing midsummer delusion. The Wall Street Journal has termed these collective events as "the largest mass purge the world has seen in decades."

This feeling has only been exacerbated by the fact that the purges are extending far beyond the Gulenists—followers of the U.S.-exiled Fethullah Gulen, blamed for the coup attempt—to include diverse opposition voices as well as harsh critics of the government. 

It was reported that among last week's purge of academics, some signatories of the January 2016 pro-peace petition have been sacked. One outspoken human rights activist and world renowned author, Asli Erdogan, has been under arrest for over two months as well. At the same time, a recent decree has targeted the autonomy of Turkish academia by cancelling the election of rectors by universities themselves. Now the head of each university will be appointed directly by the president, from among candidates chosen by the government-appointed Council of Higher Education. 

Then, early last week, the secular newspaper Cumhuriyet, the closest press organization to the opposition CHP (the same party that supported national unity after the coup) was raided, with its Editor-in-Chief detained along with twelve other executives and journalists and staff members. Included among those rounded up is Kadri Gursel, a well-seasoned and mainstream journalist. The clear message from the government was: Everyone is within our reach and we can shut you down too, if needed, just as we forced the closure of 15 other media outlets just days before. Those outlets are part of a total of a 130 media outlets forbidden to broadcast or print in Turkey. 

It is important also to remember that aside from the famous journalist, authors, musicians, and politicians detained or arrested, there are many more ordinary citizens who have been deemed guilty by association and rounded up. 

As in previous crackdowns, they’re especially hard to keep track of: they lack the name recognition or specific affiliation which attracts the attention that facilitates keeping track of the progress of the charges against them; Turkey has famously untransparent procedures regarding their treatment or trials. We can only imagine how many innocent people have been caught up.   

Turkey seems to be quite close to the critical threshold where other countries will simply write it off. The barrage of bad news is just too much to absorb. Where news stories about Turkey use to excite interest, today, I imagine most readers of the international press don’t even bother to read them. The country that for so many years captured their attention and led them to visit, study and even move there, and invest in it. The Turkish government is caused extreme damage to the country’s image, a degradation that will take years, if not decades, to reverse. 

In fact, just last week, the United States ordered consulate staff families in Istanbul to leave the city due to fears of an ISIS orchestrated attack against Americans. Just a week before that the U.S. State Department warned Americans they could be subject to attack or kidnapping in Istanbul by “extremist groups,” such as ISIS. These warnings confirm a deep and telling lack of trust in the Turkish security apparatus by Western intelligence agencies. 

As someone who led educational trips to Turkey, can I honestly take international students there now? With what can I convince academic colleagues to bring groups to a place where the freedom of speech they enjoy and uphold is disappearing, where newspaper editors and parliament members are being arrested and media outlets are shut down on a whim? 

It would be wrong to ascribe all Turkey’s problems to the coup attempt and its aftermath. But rather than using a rare moment of unity to push forward a new agenda, its government has set it back on a path of continued turmoil. However, Turkey’s democracy and civil society won’t be rescued by another round of scathing criticism, from the U.S. or by the European Union, which has already demonstrated its disinterest in prioritizing democratic freedoms over a deal keeping Syrian refugees in at bay from Europe. 

The answers to Turkey’s problems can only be found inside Turkey. If its government adamantly continues on this dangerous path of usurping power, it won’t only be the opposition who will face an unrecognizable homeland. It will also be the fate of government members, blindly marching forward in an insatiable hunt for more power, who, in their quest to rule the country, are tearing the country apart at the seams. 

*This appeared in Haaretz on November 6, 2016. Click here for the link.  

An Election Primer: One Week to go until Turkey's Snap Elections (Turkey November 2015 election, part 2)

In just one week from today, Turkish citizens will return to the ballot box in a snap-election. In the previous election update blog post, I outlined the background of the election, and why the AKP opted to return the polls, in place of working to form a coalition government (after 13 years of single-party rule). Basically, as I stated before, the formation of an AKP led-coalition government seemed like an impossible feat, with the three other parties (CHP, MHP, and HDP) staunchly opposing its plan to transfer new powers to the nation's president (and its former party leader and prime minister), Recep Tayyip Erdogan, essentially creating a super-presidency for him.  

Unfortunately, on October 10, a little over a week after writing the election update, a massive twin suicide bombing attack went off in Ankara, killing 102 people, taking place at a peace rally, which was sponsored by labor unions, heavily attended by the mostly Kurdish left HDP party, and joined by a symbolic representation from the main opposition party, the CHP. The alleged perpetrators were ISIS sympathizers who were known by the state's internal security, highlighting its failure to prevent the attack.  

Just days later, I explained in an article for Haaretz, entitled Bombs, Bans, and the Ballot Box*, why the attack had not come as a surprise: 

Over the course of the last few months, the mostly Kurdish HDP has been the target of violent attacks, including a deadly bomb attack at their election rally just two days before the June 7 parliamentary elections, and an ISIS linked-suicide attack targeting a socialist youth group affiliated with the HDP on July 20, killing 33. These major security breaches made it clear to all that another attack was highly likely. Last month, HDP offices around Turkey were vandalized and burnt to the ground in racist attacks, with the police remaining largely indifferent.

and the following:

Sadly, the Ankara bombing victims make up just part of Turkey’s rampant death toll during the last few months. Since the June elections, over 600 Turkish citizens have been killed, whether in terrorist attacks, or Turkish security forces by the PKK, or in operations carried out by the Turkish army in the southeast of the country which is under partial military curfew, or PKK fighters (who are also Turkish citizens) killed by the army. Indeed, during the elections Erdogan insisted that only an absolute AKP majority would ensure Turkey’s “peaceful” transition to a new presidential system, leaving many to believe that he was actually threatening the electorate, and that things could get messy if it did not give the AKP a clear majority. Regardless of what he actually meant, his prediction seems to have been right on.

The bombings left Turkey in a state of shock, leaving the country more polarized than ever. 

So, now, what is in store for next week?

Since the summer, most polls have predicted more-or-less the same results as the June 7 elections, with it most likely leaving the AKP, and the other parties, in a similar dilemma. Nevertheless, here are my impressions of the election campaign and what we might learn from the last few months:

1. For the current election, despite still clearly in control of the party, Erdogan has learned that the electorate has become tired of his polarizing politics, and thus took a step back in attempt to look more "presidential." However, the problem is that without Erdogan, it seems Davutoglu is not the best candidate to energize the masses, and he seems to have better luck in his normal role as a professor in the classroom, or a politician working behind the scenes. In fact, in a recent poll, when asked which leader do you think is most successful, Davutoglu got a measly 4%, with Erdogan getting the highest, with his numbers showing a decline as well.

2. Lately, Davutoglu also seems to be taking the route of polarizing politics, which certainly will not bring new votes in-especially the Kurdish voters who flocked in masses to the HDP. First, he showed a great amount of insensitivity towards the victims and families of the Ankara bombing, stating just over a week after the bombings that the AKP had seen a surge in the polls following the attack. 

If this was not enough, Davutoglu also recently commented that if the AKP is unseated, the Southeastern Kurdish regions could see the return of "white Toros" brand cars back on the streets. This has been interpreted by many as a threat since that automobile model was notorious in the 1990s of being used by gangs believed to be undercover security forces, who caused havoc on the civilian population, while whisking away people, often never to be seen again. Whether a threat or not, just the mention of it brings back dark memories for many Kurds. 

3. For the reasons stated above, it seems hard to imagine that the AKP will gain votes, with common sense pointing to it actually losing support. However, if it does gain votes, this will be attributed to the fact that many Turkish people simply see that stability trumps the chaos experienced in the last few months, and will not be attributed to Davutoglu's campaign.

4. Over the last few violent months, the opposition CHP leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has emerged as an experienced politician, showing a great amount of leadership. With the mounting attacks and deaths of the Turkish security forces on the one hand, and the attacks on Turkey's Kurdish population on the other, Kilicdaroglu has served as an important stabilizing factor, trying his best to keep Turkey from going completely off the rails. This fact alone could bring new votes to the CHP, and has created a since of momentum, which could attract some young voters back who voted for HDP in the last round. However, the party still needs to take serious steps at implementing reforms if it wishes to become a party that is able one day to surpass 30% of the overall vote (having consolidated CHP support at around 25%). Of course, a young dynamic leader would be the way to start this. However, that is easier said than done.  

5. Due to the election process, despite getting 16.3% of the vote, the MHP ended up with the same number of seats in the parliament as the HDP, which recieved 13.1 % (following the defection of one of their candidates to the AKP). Therefore, it is clear that this elections could deal a fatal blow to the MHP, if its numbers drop and the HDP votes surge, which would make it the smallest party in the parliament. For now, its leader, Devlet Bahceli is holding the party's reins tight, even after having Tugrul Turkes (the son of the iconic party founder, Alparslan Turkes) defect to the AKP. However, if its numbers drop, it is hard to imagine that Bahceli will be able to hold on to the party much longer. In the meantime, any extra votes to the MHP will hit at the AKP chances of gaining new votes.

6. The million-dollar question in this election is if the HDP can maintain, or even increase its votes, in this election. It was this party's crossing the 10% threshold that shook the Turkish politics at its core. It seems safe to say it will cross the 10% threshold again (if it does not this will increase fears of election fraud). However, with violence and military curfews being enforced over many of the Kurdish regions, election observers need to be diligent in making sure the vote is transparent and voters are able without hindrance to cast their votes.

The HDP, under the numerous attacks, which in addition to the bombings included the looting and burning down of their offices throughout the country, obviously could not put on the dynamic campaign it did leading up to the June elections. However, its charismatic co-chairman Selahattin Demirtas has demonstrated his dedication to keep the party on track, and has proven his ability to be a major player in Turkish political system for a long time coming. If the party loses votes, this could be attributed to its lack of influence in getting the PKK to stop attacks against the Turkish military (regardless if this is a realistic claim or not). However, this could be offset by a new group of silent voters who have been influenced by the party's motivation to run a clean campaign that still offers a genuine voice to Turkey's minorities and its dedication to change the "old system" of Turkey once and for all. 

While a coalition government following the next elections seems likely, we will need to wait until then to discuss the possibilities! Let us hope that whatever the outcome, Turkey will see brighter days in the near future.  

*The article is also featured on my blog

Bombings, Bans and the Ballot-box Turkey on Edge*

No words can express the tragedy that hit Turkey last Saturday, when over 100 people were killed and hundreds more injured following a twin suicide-bomb attack at a peace rally in the capital Ankara. The rally was sponsored by labor unions, heavily attended by the mostly Kurdish left HDP party, and joined by a symbolic representation from the main opposition party, the CHP.

Just hours after the attack, the Turkish government declared an official three-day mourning period in recognition of the nation’s largest terrorist attack ever. The finger of blame is increasingly being pointed at Islamic State, or ISIS, sympathizers. However, rather than uniting Turkey, the bombing only has strengthened existing divisions.  

After the initial shock of the sheer scope of the bombing, anger was the reaction of many to the bombing - directed at the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the religiously conservative AKP interim-election government, led by the Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. For many Turkish citizens it was no surprise that such an attack had happened to begin with.  

Over the course of the last few months, the mostly Kurdish HDP has been the target of violent attacks, including a deadly bomb attack at their election rally just two days before the June 7 parliamentary elections, and an ISIS linked-suicide attack targeting a socialist youth group affiliated with the HDP on July 20, killing 33. These major security breaches made it clear to all that another attack was highly likely. Last month, HDP offices around Turkey were vandalized and burnt to the ground in racist attacks, with the police remaining largely indifferent.

Of course, things soured for Erdogan’s AKP following those June elections, when it lost its parliamentary majority, and the HDP crossed the 10% voter threshold. This lead to political deadlock, since the AKP was not able to form either a coalition with the main opposition CHP, or a narrow government with the nationalist MHP, leading the country to snap-elections to be held on November 1.

Both Erdogan and Davutoglu have done their utmost to delegitimize the HDP, a campaign that began even before the June general elections, once it was clear that the HDP would not support Erdogan’s quest to allocate further extensive powers to the presidency that he holds. Following the elections, the embryonic peace process facilitated by Kurdish MPs between the outlawed Kurdish separatist movement, the PKK, and the Turkish state collapsed, both sides now fully immersed in fighting each other.  

Following the Ankara attack, HDP’s head, Selahattin Demirtas, lashed out at the government claiming not only was it delinquent in preventing the bombing but that members of the state institutions were also complicit in the attack. No evidence was provided, but for some in Turkey such a damning accusation didn’t seem so far from an obvious truth; many others believe that Ankara has consistently turned a blind eye to ISIS sympathizers, with fatal results.

While the AKP denies these claims as completely preposterous, Turkey’s long history of its intelligence services working within its own autonomous and unaccountable set of rules fuels such claims. Indeed, on Wednesday an Ankara court upheld the government’s request for a complete media blackout on the bombing (covering “all kinds of news, interviews, criticism and similar publications in print, visual, social media and all kinds of Internet media”) only heightening the suspicion that few details will ever come to light. The ban came into effect just as reports that the suicide bombers had been identified; both were known to the  police and intelligence services, one suspect's brother is said to have committed a suicide bombing blamed on ISIS only three months earlier 

The fear that the full account of the attack will never come to light is hardly unfounded in recent Turkish history: in the past, when the media was banned from reporting on specific events, such as the 2011 Uludere affair (34 Kurdish civilians mistakenly believed to be PKK terrorists killed in an airstrike), or the 2014 alleged transfer of Turkish arms to Islamist radical groups in Syria, perhaps even to ISIS, the censorship seemed to have been aimed at covering up government complicity, with the benefit of a complete lack of transparency.

The media ban is the latest expression of an accelerating clampdown on a free press in Turkey. Just a day before the bombing the editor of the English-language newspaper Todays Zaman, Bulent Kenes, was arrested on live television for allegedly “insulting” Erdogan, while two other journalists joined a long list of other citizens found guilty of insulting Erdogan. Fortunately this week Kenes was released but still faces prison if found guilty.

Sadly, the Ankara bombing victims make up just part of Turkey’s rampant death toll during the last few months. Since the June elections, over 600 Turkish citizens have been killed, whether in terrorist attacks, or Turkish security forces by the PKK, or in operations carried out by the Turkish army in the southeast of the country which is under partial military curfew, or PKK fighters (who are also Turkish citizens) killed by the army. Indeed, during the elections Erdogan insisted that only an absolute AKP majority would ensure Turkey’s “peaceful” transition to a new presidential system, leaving many to believe that he was actually threatening the electorate, and that things could get messy if it did not give the AKP a clear majority. Regardless of what he actually meant, his prediction seems to have been right on.

The AKP has radically failed on numerous fronts. If it had not been for the main opposition CHP leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, whose leadership bridges the country’s dangerous political polarization, and the determination of the opposition parties, Turkey could have very well have run off the rails of democracy by now. However, a culture of fear is consolidating in Turkey, and its effects will reverberate not only over the coming fortnight preceding the general elections, but in the weeks and months following it as well.

This week, Turkey’s national football team took on Iceland in the conservative city of Konya, an AKP stronghold. Jeers and whistles marred the moment of silence for those killed in Ankara. The lessons of the bombing have clearly still not been learnt.

*This article appeared in Haaretz on 15 October 2015, please click here for article.

The Real Winner is Hope! A Look at the Turkish Election results

The recent Turkish elections dealt a major blow to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and a greater blow to the die-hard fans of Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It was clear in the run-up to the elections that this was a mandate on whether-or-not Turkey was headed to a super-presidency, or what I called in an earlier article a ‘Putinization’ of the Turkish political system. The Turkish people gave an overwhelming no to the AKP’s plans; the AKP received only 40.8% of the vote, dropping a whopping 9% since the 2011 vote. For the first time since 2002, the AKP can no longer rule as a single party, well under the 276 seats needed. 

This number of seats have not been finalized and are fluctuating; however tehy will remain within
 one-two seats of the above estimate. Source Hurriyet 

The real source of evening’s exhilaration was that the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) strong showing with an impressive 13% of the overall vote. Their success is attributed to its charismatic leader, Selahattin Demirtas, and its inclusive ticket, which promises social and political justice not just to Kurds, but to all socially oppressed groups, such as women and the LGBT community. They also have created coalitions with socialists and environmentalists. Through dedication and hard work, the HDP managed what had seemed impossible: a mostly Kurdish party shattered the high 10% threshold.  

In addition to this, while the Republican People's Party (CHP) remained about the same, at 25% of the vote, it held ground, even with the flow of CHP voters to the HDP, who were determined to block Erdogan’s plans for a super-presidency.  As for the National Movement Party (MHP), it gained votes, up to 16%, stolen from the AKP. In fact, this was exactly what Erdogan had feared, on the campaign trail he often inserted nationalists rhetoric. However, this backfired, with it alienating the AKP’s conservative Kurdish voters, who also ended up not buying into Erdogan’s “Koran-thumping” politics.

So what went wrong for the AKP?

Since the Gezi Park protests, Erdogan has done his utmost to alienate moderate voices in his party. In fact, with the breakout of the December 2013 corruption scandal, Erdogan has increasingly built a wall of political cronies around him, who join with him in creating a chorus of hate and fear. In fact, during the election season, Erdogan overshadowed the main AKP candidate, Prime Minister Davutoglu, regularly rallying, never missing the chance to curse Gulenists, Armenians, Gays, and Jews. This might have worked or been brushed aside when Turkey’s economy was booming, but certainly would not be tolerated in a sluggish one.  Not to mention the fact that many Turkish citizens seem to have become fed up with Erdogan whose politics are the main source of polarization. 

Unable to stop Erdogan and his hateful press, Davutoglu figured that he could balance the die-hard Erdoganists by staying close to more moderate and sensible politicians. However, the problem is that Erdogan has become impossible to control; yet, without Erdogan, the moderate voices of the AKP simply do not amount to much in terms of political clout. This is exacerbated by the fact that the public clearly sees the moderates' silence in the wake of corruption, disregard for law, and Erdogan’s extravagance.   

Thus this election has shown that not only Turkey is at a crossroads, but also AKP’s moderate voices. While it is hard to imagine they will fight for the full control of the party, if they don’t show the public that they are serious about abandoning Erdogan’s plans for a super-presidency, it seems the party could be doomed to a bleaker future. In short, it seems hard to imagine that the CHP, MHP, or the HDP, will allow Erdogan to move forward, blocking the AKP’s chances of entering a coalition government.  

So what now?

Of course, it is still early to tell. Already CHP leader Kilicdaroglu has made public his thoughts of the possibility of a CHP-MHP-HDP coalition. While it seems like a long shot, Turkey has seen equally strange coalitions in the past. In his article on the election, political analyst Serkan Demirtas states that this could happen based on "certain conditions and with the purpose of undermining Erdoğan’s position. This large coalition would later take the country to polls with, for example, a reduced election threshold and other legal amendments for the further normalization of the country.”

In my opinion, we will need at least a week or two to pass until we can speak wisely on what possibilities could emerge. If I could weigh in with my life experience, I am never surprised at politicians taking extreme turns with a whiff of power. We will need to play this one out. However, it seems safe to say that new elections, which could happen in 90 days would be a worst-case scenario for the AKP. There is no reason to imagine that in a second round that it could fare better, and another election could lead to deeper divides in the party.

For now, I will congratulate the HDP and convey my wishes that this will lead Turkey to a brighter future, one where the wounds of the past can begin to be heal. It will not be easy, and it would be foolish to think that Erdogan will take this election’s message to heart and begin relinquishing his attempts to receive extended presidential powers.

Nevertheless, as I watched the election results with a group of Turkish university professors and students, I could not help notice the relief on the numerous political analysts’ faces streaming live on Turkish television. A glimmer of hope emerged perhaps for the first time since the Gezi Park protests; indeed, the election results should be treated simply as a glimpse of what better days might lie ahead, providing some hope for a better future. 

Sadly, this all came at a heavy price. Just two days before the election, a bomb went off at an HDP rally, killing two and injuring many more. Today, as I write this, I have learned that that a third person died of his wounds. This just shows us that in no way are things as simple as they might seem now. 

    

The Turkish State against Frederike Geerdink*

Türkçe versiyonu için linke tıklayın: 

As Turkey continues to clamp down on journalists, the Turkish state has now targeted a foreign journalist on what appears to be trumped up terror charges. This week, an indictment was issued against Frederike Geerdink, a Dutch journalist, who has been based in Turkey since 2006, on charges of spreading propaganda via some of her writings, on behalf of the outlawed Kurdish Worker’s Party, the PKK, with her facing up to five years in prison. 

The indictment comes at a time of increased conflict in Turkey’s Southeastern Kurdish region, and the proliferation of state violence, which has steadily increased during the last six months. Therefore, the charges against Geerdink should be placed within the context of silencing journalists who write about Turkey’s decades-old Kurdish conflict, and not within the context of the recent attempts by the Turkish government to stomp out criticism of its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

In fact, Geerdink’s thoughts appearing in both international and local news sources, such as the Independent and al-Monitor, or her popular blog, Kurdish Matters, in addition to her work appearing in the online Turkish newspaper Diken, must have sparked the government to take action, in order to put an end to her constant challenging it. However, it must be stressed that due to her status as a foreigner it made the headlines, while many stories go unnoticed, and a long list of Kurdish journalists jailed in the past. For example, just last week 12 students were sentenced to 20 years in prison on terror charges for singing Kurdish political songs on a university campus, while selling a pro-Kurdish paper.

All of this of course is occurring while the Turkish government is locked in a peace process together with the jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, in attempt to end the thirty years of violence that has led to approximately 40,000 dead. However, following the ISIS siege on the Kurdish-controlled Syrian city Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) last September (liberated just over a week ago), when Erdogan clarified that for him Kurdish YPG fighters, who have close ties with the PKK, were no better than the ISIS terrorists, tensions flared. For the Kurds, the comparison between the two groups made it clear that even if Turkey was not aiding ISIS, it was certainly set out on a campaign of demoralization against them.

Further, Turkey’s Kurds became increasingly frustrated at the double standard where in the recent past, jihadists set on joining ISIS have been documented numerous times crossing the Turkish-Syrian border unhindered, all the while teargas filled the lungs of those attending protests on the Kobani border, with the Turkish army blocking those trying to cross the border to join the battle against ISIS. In one of these protests, live ammunition was used, leading to the death of a young woman, Kader Ortakaya.   

The tension exploded however on October 6-7, when the protests turned violent with the supporters of the Islamist pro-government Kurdish Huda-Par clashing with the supporters of the mostly Kurdish HDP, who called protests in support of Kobani. While both sides blamed the other for the almost fifty people killed in street violence and targeted killings, including children, no state investigation has taken place, with it unclear what exactly the was the state’s role (including its void) in the unfolding of these events.     

If this was not enough, clashes continued in Turkey’s Southeastern city of Cizre between Turkish security forces and pro-PKK Kurds, which led to more deaths, proving to be a major test for the strained peace process; just last month, two minors were shot with live ammunition by the state security forces, killing 14-yr old Umit Kurt, and 12-yr old Nihat Kazanhan. In relation to the latter, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, vehemently denied state involvement in the killing. However, a video emerged, which made its round on the Turkish nightly news, exhibiting otherwise.

It is this reality that Dutch journalist Frederike Geerdink is working and living in, as she is the only western journalist who resides in the Kurdish regions. And, while she is set on telling the harsh truth, writing in one of her blogs that “no, I am not scared. The state cannot shut me up, not even if they prosecute me, throw me in jail or throw me out of the country,” it seems the government has made a calculation that it is much more risky having her report, than the possible diplomatic fallout this will create.

Therefore, while there is no shortage of people ranging to beauty queens and high school students being placed on trial for their harsh criticism of Erdogan, the current case against Geerdink seems to be tied to the greater tradition of the Turkish state attempts at silencing the violent actions it is using against its own citizens in order to maintain hegemonic control of its Southeastern Kurdish regions.  

It seems safe to say that in this battle, Erdogan, and his AKP loyalists, could find new friends among even their greatest opponents, who see the Kurdish agenda as a tangible threat to the Turkish state. In other words, Geerdink’s sharp reporting and dedication at reporting what she sees and how she understands it, along with her Turkish counterparts, have a double hard time at doing their work, which is seen as both a threat to the ruling government and likewise to those among the opposition who believe that her reporting is nothing more than PKK propaganda. With the stakes so high, there is no doubt that Frederike Geerdink’s case could serve as a test for future international journalists in Turkey.  

 *This article appeared in Turkish, in the online newspaper Diken on February 6, 2015 (with possible revisions due to translation).  

This one is for Kobane: Kader will not return home, will the refugees be able to?

I wonder what is here (in Kobane)? Petrol? Gold? Diamonds? (Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, October 31, 2014)

Earlier this week, I took part in audience at City College in New York to hear Salih Muslim Muhammad (often referred only by the first two names) , the c0-chairman of the Kurdish PYD (Democratic Union Party), based in Northern Syria. Beaming live via Skype, he shared with the audience that victory was near in Kobane (Arabic-Ayn al-Arab). For the last 68 days, the PYD's main fighting force the YPG (People's Protection Units) has been holding ground to the forces of the Islamic State (ISIS).

Muslim provided the audience with an upbeat assessment, cautiously predicting that the city would be freed from the last snipers in a matter of days; however, he stressed that this was only the beginning and there was still much work to be done in clearing ISIS in the surround villages. He also clarified that US strikes played a crucial role, and remarked that it was disappointing that some regional powers were still making operations difficult, even when it came to assisting humanitarian aid. It seemed quite obvious he was referring to Turkey.

The news that Kobane's Kurdish forces have gained major ground is good news indeed, and will be welcomed by a coalition of regional and international voices. However, for Turkey, it marks a major miscalculation by its policy makers who even if trying to portray the country as leading a non-interventionist policy, could not cover up the fact that it appeared to most as a concerted demoralization campaign against the Kurds. Even with Turkey's legitimate concerns on how this would play out among their own Kurdish community, it was a short sighted strategy that left Turkey portrayed in world opinion as if it was hoping for an ISIS controlled Kobane. 

In fact, Erdogan numerous times stated that he was not at all sure why so many were supporting Kobane, when so many other cities in Syria did not receive half as much attention, as if this was some conspiracy against Turkey, to strengthen the Kurds vis-a-vis Turkey. Perhaps, Turkey should have placed it in the following terms: once Kobane is back in the hands of the PYD, it is highly likely that the recent 300,000+ Syrian Kurdish refugees will be able to return to their homes. With refugees placing a huge weight on Turkey, what could be better than this. 

Recent picture of Kader Ortakaya 

It was in fact the sheer simplicity of understanding that the people of Kobane were fighting for their homes, that caused so many Turkish citizens to cross the border to fight. Sadly, the fate of many of them was that they will not return, killed in street battles with ISIS. However, the tragic killing of Kader Ortakaya, which took place on November 6, was much different. She was not killed by ISIS, but as the result of a clash with the Turkish army that opened fire on protesters who were creating a human chain at the border. 

A declared revolutionary, and a graduate student at Marmara University, who was overtaken by the call to act, the 28-yr old Kader remained weeks at the border, with the a group called the Initiative of Free Art. Just days before her death in fact she was interviewed by Norwegian television, where she seemed full of hope (which was posted on her facebook). In her last letter home, she explained her convictions to her family, of why she had made her way down to Kobane, with her last sentence making sure her scholarship money went to buying medicine for her sick mother.  

The funeral of Kader Ortakaya

While Kader never made her way back home, let us hope that the refugees from Kobane will be able to in the near future. Even if Kobane does not have gold, the oil of Iraqi Kurdistan, or even diamonds, for hundreds of thousands of people it is their home. What more could one ask for than to be able to return home, rather than being subjected to the humiliating and poor lives as refugees. It seems that it is this part, the simple human side of the story, so many Turkish politicians clearly overlooked, without even taking into consideration the massacre that would have happened in Kobane had ISIS succeeded in taking the city.

A Hunger Strike:An Opposition behind Bars

During the last 53 days, many things have happened in Turkey and the world. For me, I started the university semester and I cannot believe that next week midterms will begin.  Summer ended, lasting extra long, and finally it is getting quite chilly outside. A film about Muslims sparked outrage. More recently, a hurricane named Sandy battered the East coast. I could go on and delve into different news stories. However, one thing we perhaps missed was that in Turkey, for the last 53 days, almost 700 Kurdish prisoners in Turkish jails have gone on a hunger strike (starting on different dates). They are demanding their right as Turkish citizens to study in their mother tongue , have the right to speak Kurdish in courts (with a translator), and want an end to the solitary confinement of the outlawed Kurdish PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan.

Kurds in Turkey's western city of Adana protest in the name of the hunger strikers

Those following the Turkish news, or my blog during the last almost four years, will know that Turkey has for over thirty years been subjected to an ongoing armed uprising of its Kurdish population in Turkey’s southeastern regions. During these years, over 40,000 Turkish citizens have been killed (on both sides) and throughout the 1990’s Turkey offered no negotiations, and sought out a military solution. The Kurdish organization, the PKK, recognized by most of the western world as a terrorist organization, has no chance of winning their armed struggle, but they also inflict great challenges on the Turkish military, and this year alone, there has been almost 100 security personnel killed. 

While the armed struggle is led by the outlawed PKK, with their leader, Abdullah Ocalan, being jailed on an island prison not far from Istanbul, the civil branch of the Kurdish struggle is played out through a political party, the Peace and Democratic Party (BDP). This party is in the Turkish parliament and the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is currently in the process of trying to strip some of the BDP members of their parliamentary status due to an event where the MPs took photos embracing PKK guerrillas.  Erdogan, who for the first part of his ten-year tenure worked to reach an agreement with the Kurds, more recently has switched to a zero-tolerance policy towards their demands.

During the last few months, as a result of the growing rift between the Turkish state and the Kurds, we have seen an increase in the violent clashes between the Turkish military and the PKK fighters.  On the civilian front, thousands of Kurds have been jailed (along with their Turkish allies), including academics, writers, journalists, and elected officials (mayors to MPs). Many are held months and years without trial, and often charged on anti-terrorist laws, which the United Nations Human Rights Committee recently criticized as "incompatible with international law," and implenting "unacceptable restrictions on the right of due process for accused people."

It is this atmosphere that Kurdish prisoners sought out to become active in their opposition; where they are silenced in jail, a massive hunger strike has awoken both Kurds and Turks (both Turkish citizens) to the ongoing Kurdish plight.  The Turkish government once again is showing that it is losing its grip over the society at large (see last week’s blog on Republican Day march), with the PM Erdogan ridiculing the BDP leaders as ones that feast at huge banquets, while their counterparts are on a hunger strike; he was basing his claims on a picture of the leaders at a feast, which was taken two months before the strike. On an official state visit to Germany, Erdogan, standing next to German PM Merkel, even went so far as to call the strike a political “show,” claiming that only one person is really on a hunger strike.  

Well, as Erdogan tries to brush off the strike, during the last two weeks, the mainstream Turkish media has been covering events on a daily basis. Massive demonstrations have been held in Turkey’s southeastern cities, such as Diyarbakir and Van, and in some western cities with large Kurdish populations, such as Adana.  A general strike was observed throughout most of the southeast last Tuesday with shopkeepers closing their shutters and children refusing to go to school.  There is no question that the Kurdish question just in a matter of a few months has managed to bring a huge split in the society, with Kurds and Turks reaching a dangerous divide.    

Turkey, almost a decade ago witnessed a prison “death strike,” held by a Turkish radical left movement with some dying; however, their support was limited, not like the Kurdish hunger strikers. Last year, the BDP member and MP Sebahat Tuncel, who herself might find herself behind bars due to an ongoing court case, wrote an article, which appeared in the NY Times. It was an op-ed which talked about that the Kurds in Turkey also might have their own “Arab Spring.” If the government does not act soon, and strikers start to die one by one, the Turkish government could be faced with a backlash that it has not seen until now, giving impetus to Tuncel’s words. Further, with the Turkish society polarized at the seams, such a scenario could lead to a general consensus that Erdogan, the invincible leader, might just not make it through the storm. 

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Two Long Years For Cihan (upcoming court date March 23)

Cihan: two years under arrest

On March 23, once again Cihan Kırmızıgül will be brought before a court in Besiktas. Over two years ago, on a chilly winter morning, Cihan, while waiting for a bus, found himself wrapped up not only in a keffiyeh to keep him warm but also in a court case that has gone on far too long; one that again has proven the Turkish legal system as falling short of protecting the "right of innocence until proven guilty."  


All evidence and common sense points to the fact that Cihan had nothing to do with the protesters chanting Kurdish slogans, who clashed with police and threw molotov cocktails targeting a neighborhood market. Rather, he was an innocent bystander who happened to be wearing a keffiyeh, one similar to those who committed the attack. With no other evidence linking him to the crime other than the keffiyeh, Cihan has been held for over two years in solitary confinement charged with taking part in an act of terror. All common sense would lead to the simple understanding that that Cihan was at the wrong place at the wrong time, and certainly the fact that he is of Kurdish origin led to the apparent false charges. Yes, for this he has been held in a F-type solitary cell. If this Kafkaesque scenario was not enough, the prosecutor has called for a 45-year term sentence, if he is found guilty of the crime    


Cihan is 23 years old, one of four children, whose family migrated from Adiyaman to Adana, and later came ot study industrial engineering at Galatasaray University.  Importantly, many of the Galatasaray faculty have been following the case closely, and have been present at his hearings. I might add that he has no criminal record and apparently is just what he adds up to be: a serious young aspiring bright student, someone who in normal circumstances should be a poster-boy for Turkey's education system: a youngster of Kurdish origin, from a rural background, that despite all the cards stacked up against him reached the top and integrated into one of Turkey's most prestigious public institutions.  Truly, this is a tragedy.      


Unfortunately, Cihan is joined by about 600 students who have found themselves behind bars awaiting trial. Different than Cihan's case these students were arrested for peaceful protests that they held on university campuses targeting government policies and often disrupting speeches made by politicians.  These students are being held on numerous inflated charges, with some facing decades in jail if found guilty.


This week, the two well-known journalists, Ahmet Sik and Nedim Sener were released after their 375 days spent in jail on suspicion of being related to the Ergenekon plot. Lets hope that their release marks a change in the Turkish judicial system, and more importantly that the Turkish government take the necessary steps that laws are passed to protect its citizens from such injustices.  If Cihan is released on March 23 this will be another step in the right direction.  


For more information on the fate of students and professors being held see:

the English website of the Transnational Work Group on Academic Liberty and Freedom of Research in Turkey:  
http://gitamerica.blogspot.com/  where you can connect to a site also in Turkish, French, German, and Italian. 


and the Turkish site, ran by students: http://www.mechulogrenci.com/basinda-cikanlar

A Sad Reminder about the Kurdish Question

As someone who has lived with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for over the last two decades of my life, I was sad and frustrated when hearing about the 13 soldiers killed in eastern Turkey yesterday. Like a ritual I am too far familiar with, I waited until the morning to read the names of the fallen soldiers, to hear their stories, to find out who they were; to find out who the people in the uniforms really were. I also read alternative news sources to learn about the other side, the Kurdish fighters killed; understanding that both the soldiers and the ones fighting are both Turkish citizens; both caught up in a struggle which has gone on far too long. While there are counter narratives at what happened, I do not find comfort in any of the sources. Last night, the dreams of young people were snatched away by gunfire and explosion, leaving their families to mourn for days, months, years, and lifetimes.

The clashes come at a time of great uncertainty in Turkey. Following the elections, some of the independent candidates affiliated with the mostly Kurdish Peace and Democratic Party (BDP), have been blocked from entering the parliament due to the fact that they are awaiting trial for crimes related to belonging to an affiliate group of the outlawed PKK Kurdish Workers Party. Topping the list is Hatip Dicle, plus six others out of the total of 36 independent candidates, who are barred from entering the parliament. It is important to point out also that in the case of Hatip Dicle, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) approved his candidacy previous to the election and only after his victory did they announce that they would not accept his candidacy handing the parliamentary seat over the to the ruling AK party candidate. Until now, no compromise has been reached and the 36 elected members of parliament have made it clear that they will not enter parliament until every last one of their members are allowed to enter parliament.

If this was not enough, the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), an umbrella group for Kurdish groups has declared they are aiming for democratic autonomy, something that stands in complete contradiction to the Turkish state, with even the ruling AK party, once sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, not even coming close to accepting. The congress’s findings were announced by Aysel Tugluk a BDP elected MP, who stated that the “Kurdish people do not want to be a non-status population anymore. There is no other population in the world like Kurds, which include 40 million people and do not have rights. We, as Kurdish people, are declaring our democratic sovereignty, holding to Turkey’s national unity on the basis of an understanding of a common motherland, territorial unity and the perspective of a democratic nation.”

While it was clear that the Kurdish demands have risen, something to be expected after securing such an important block in the parliament, it is incumbent upon them to ensure that the Kurdish struggle remains within the realm of civil action and that they work hard to secure a new ceasefire between the Turkish state and the PKK. Even if the BDP supports passive resistance and knows that the Kurdish citizens of Turkey have gained more through civil struggle than military, on this day it needs to reiterated. Likewise, the AK party and the opposition People's Republican Party (CHP) need to quickly find a solution to the parliamentary crisis and to ensure that work on a new constitution can begin which will offer the Kurdish society rights which they have been demanding for decades. The alternative is more bloodshed and violence; something that if it is not dealt with effectively will certainly only get worse.

For articles on this topic see:

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=dtk-declares-democratic-sovereignty-2011-07-15