The Gaza Crisis: Some thoughts on Region and Questions to Israel

The Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, seems to have read the region well before he started the recent military campaign in Gaza. With the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Syria in the midst of a civil war, and Turkish-Israeli relations at the lowest point ever, Israel will be able to continue with their military operation with little interference.

Since the overthrowing of Hosni Mubarak, Israeli-Egyptian relations have been put to a test.  The new president, Mohammad Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood which is aligned with Hamas, has had to walk a tight rope between pleasing his constituency and keeping the US satisfied. Clearly, for Israel, this marked a change; Mubarak, had been a strong ally of the Jewish state: Egypt, together with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Saudi Arabia, had unofficial alliance against Hamas, and served as a force countering Hezbollah.

Immediately before the Israeli escalation, which was set off by the assassination of the Hamas military leader, Ahmad al-Jabari, Egypt had been in the midst of writing up a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. The fact that Israel chose to disrespect the Egyptian efforts (something they did to Turkish PM Erdogan right before Operation Cast-Lead), must have outraged Morsi to no end; once the Israeli massive bombardment of the Strip began, the Egyptian ambassador to Israel was recalled. Nevertheless, just two days later it seems that all eyes are on Egpyt to broker a deal. Just this morning the Egyptian PM, Hesham Kandil, paid a visit to Gaza. On Sunday, Erdogan will be arriving for an already planned visit aimed at boosting economic ties between Egypt and Turkey, and the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon will arrive to Cairo on Tuesday.  In other words, Egypt is still in the picture and it seems that Morsi will continue to straddle the tight rope, at least in the near future. However, if the Israeli Operation turns into a long term operation, similar to Operation Cast Lead, which took place almost four years ago, Israel could be entering dangerous waters, perhaps crossing a line in which they will not be able to salvage their relations with Egypt. Of course, Israel knows this, and it seems like they will work to cut this operation short.

On Israel’s northern front, Hezbollah opted not to act during the last major Israeli operation in Gaza (it did so in the summer 2007), so it is unlikely that they will now. Especially, since there main supporter in the region, Syria, is caught up in a civil war. The fact that the Assad regime has managed to kill over 30,000 of his citizens, has taken a great deal of support away from the Palestinian cause, also making the Israelis work a bit easier. Put bluntly, who in Syria will look towards defending the Palestinian cause when they are struggling and dying on a daily basis, with almost 500,000 Syrian refugees dispersed in the surrounding countries.  As for the Hezbollah, they too know that any misguided act could throw Lebanon into chaos, something which would not serve them well for now. It seems that the Israeli government also took these issues into consideration.

Perhaps, most important of all is Turkey. During the last decade, Israeli-Turkish relations have deteriorated. While most attribute this solely to PM Erodgan, we need to keep in mind that the Turkish people have always been overwhelmingly pro-Palestinian. In fact, warm relations with Israel have always been contingent on Israel’s progress at securing a peace deal with the Palestinians. Some might be surprised that Erdogan, during the first years of his tenure, breathed new life in the relations with Israel, after his predecessor, the late (secular) Bulent Ecevit, accused Israelis of committing genocide in the Jenin Refugee camp in 2002. Now that Erdogan has taken the reins of the Turkish state away from the Turkish army command, Israel is left with no internal support. Ironically, due to Turkey’s placing Israeli-Turkish ties on hold following the Gaza Flotilla incident, there is little Turkey can do for the Palestinians. Last year, in an article published in Haaretz (translated to Turkish in Radikal), I argued that if Erdogan really wanted to help the Palestinians, he would have to strengthen his ties with Israel. The current Gaza affair has shown how true this is. With no ambassador, and minimal diplomatic ties, what can Erdogan do?

For now, it seems Erdogan will use the strengthening of relations with Egypt as a way to pressure Israel, perhaps even establishing a strategic military alliance. While some analysts are speculating that in the post Arab Spring period, Turkey and Egypt will compete for regional hegemony, we need to remember that recently Turkey loaned Egypt one billion dollars. Egypt needs Turkey, and economically, Turkey needs to branch out into new markets. Further, the loan deal should also be seen as a tide change in regional trends since for decades Egypt has relied solely on US financial support. 

Now to the Iranians; it seems that they must know that the current Israeli operation in Gaza, very well could be preparing the Israeli home front for a war with Iran.  One of the Israeli scenarios was if they went to war with Iran, Hamas would join in, causing havoc on the southern front. However, with a beaten Hamas, Israel will be able to focus on its northern front, in case Iran has Hezbollah join the escapade. Further, an obvious outcome of the current conflict, even if not planned, is with Hamas rockets falling on the Tel Aviv metropolitan are, the Israeli government will be able to assess the overall situation, if in the not too-far-future, Iran's missiles will be falling on Israel's largest population center.   

Perhaps Netanyahu, along with his FM, Avigdor Lieberman, who seems keen on wrecking all of Israeli ties with Arab and Muslim countries, might have taken all of the above scenarios into consideration. However, with all the political gambles being taken, it seems that they still are far from answering the real questions: How much longer will Israel be able to remain an isolated Middle East state, occupying Palestinian territories? Why would they exchange a peace with Egypt,  albeit a cold one, for a hostile one? Why does the current government not do more to improve their relations with Turkey, since it was Israel who led the botched Flotilla campaign. Why have they recently threatened to topple Palestinian moderates, like Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas?

If you get rid of Abbas, who will Israel speak with?

The essential question really then is what are the Israelis waiting for?  If the Israeli electorate does not wake up and pressure their leaders to work towards a comprehensive agreement they might find themselves living in a de facto bi-national state, one that will need to rely on an apartheid system to continue its existence. Time is running out, and an operation in Gaza will do little to solve Israel's real existential questions. 

===================================

FOLLOW ME on TWITTER @istanbultelaviv for more on whats happening in Turkey and Israel/Palestine, the uprising in Syria, and the Middle East at large.  

  

The Escalation in Gaza: its Twitterization and how Operation Hits at the Heart of Israeli Democracy (Israeli 2013 Election Coverage, 3)

Late yesterday afternoon (in Istanbul), while doing my evening shop in a supermarket a beep came from i-phone. It was an update from Yedioth Ahronot, informing me that Israel had set off on Operation Pillar of Defense against the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. I sighed, grabbed enough food to make dinner, and within minutes had returned home to see the developments. 

Twitterization of the Conflict

Well, my fears were immediately confirmed. First, turning on the BBC, news was coming in of a massive Israeli onslaught, which began with the targeted assassination of Hamas military leader, Ahmad al-Jabari.  However, as a relatively new twitter user, I knew this would provide me with good sources to see how this struggle was playing out.  In English, Hebrew, Arabic, and Turkish, I scanned the tweets, one by one.  One tweet was from Gaza announcing bombs going off, another Gazan mentioned that rockets had just been fired at Israel; within minutes, an Israeli tweeted that sirens had just gone off in Beer Sheva. In other words, I was watching the war from my home in Istanbul, succumbed by the feeling that I was there.  Definitely, a post-modern reality. Not surprisingly, I later learned that the Israeli army first announced the beginning of the operation via their twitter account.  

I myself began to tweet in different languages. In Turkish I tweeted one thing, in Hebrew another, and English something different (need to add Arabic fonts!), trying to speak to different communities. It turned out to be a frustrating exercise since I know if I was in Israel I would have been out in the street demonstrating, shouting out in a full voice: no to escalation, no to war! Yes, by tweeting I was actually addressing a group, who I could not see. In a street demonstration, I can capture the eyes of thousands, it is real-time, with real reactions of people, some clapping and others cursing. In fact, almost four years ago, I was in Israel during Operation Cast Lead and we did that: together Jews and Palestinians, we took to the streets.

The Escalation and the Upcoming Israeli Elections

Yes, it has been four years since the last Israeli-Palestinian war in Gaza. Sadly, neither social media, nor people protesting, have succeeded in finding some way to convince both Israelis and Palestinians to give up arms and find a solution. This latest escalation is typical.  It began last week as skirmish on the Gaza-Israel border between Hamas and the Israeli army, leading to Israeli reprisal and Hamas shooting rockets into Israel’s southern cities. Which side was “first” is not important.  By targeting Jabari, Israel knew that this was a declaration of war, and rather than continuing the negotiations for a cease-fire, they escalated.

What is worrying is the timing of the escalation.  With the Israeli elections just a little over two months away, many analysts are accusing Israeli PM Netanyahu as using the onslaught to convince the Israeli people of his ability to manage a major operation, especially since he has made it clear that he believes Israel should target Iran, in the event they are close to obtaining nuclear arms. For his Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, who now leads the small Atsmaut (Independence) Party, after defecting from Labor, a successful operation might actually give his party enough votes to cross the threshold to enter parliament. 

Well, we can speculate all we want, and I am sure that there was not a scenario where Netanyahu and Barak sat down and said to one another, “time to start a war.”; however, how could this not be in the back of their minds. In any case, Netanyahu must be quite confident of the operation's success since dragging in Israel to a major conflict could also lead to him losing elections. With Israel being militarily superior, this scenario seems unlikely.*

I will conclude by saying then, yes, Israel has a right to defend itself, just like the Palestinians have a right to defend themselves. However, what might be at stake here is actually the Israeli democracy itself. The truth be known, the recent escalation could have been diverted, which leads us to the simple but loaded question:

In a democracy, doesn't the launching of such an operation before an election counter the essence of a democratic system? I would say yes, and therefore argue that the timing of this operation is not only an attack on Gaza, but also on democracy and the future essence of the Israeli state.

*Israeli superiority is also related to changes in regional politics, which I will address in an upcoming blog.